Determinants of bankruptcies in leveraged buyouts by Virkkala, Otto-Ville
Determinants of bankruptcies in leveraged buyouts
Rahoitus
Maisterin tutkinnon tutkielma
Otto-Ville Virkkala
2015
Rahoituksen laitos
Aalto-yliopisto
Kauppakorkeakoulu
Powered by TCPDF (www.tcpdf.org)
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Determinants of bankruptcies in 
leveraged buyouts  
 
 
 
 
 
Master’s Thesis 
Otto-Ville Virkkala 
Spring 2015 
Finance 
 
 
 
 
Approved in the Department of Finance __ / __20__ and awarded the grade 
 _______________________________________________________  
  
 
 
Aalto University, P.O. BOX 11000, 00076 
AALTO 
www.aalto.fi 
Abstract of master’s thesis 
 
 
Author Otto-Ville Virkkala 
Title of thesis Determinants of bankruptcies in leveraged buyouts 
Degree Master of Science in Business Administration 
Degree programme Finance 
Thesis advisor(s) Professor Sami Torstila 
Year of approval 2015 Number of pages 87 Language English 
 
OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
In this thesis, I study the determinants of bankruptcies in leveraged buyouts. By constructing a 
large cross-sectional sample, my objective is to recognise factors that are associated with the 
probability that a leveraged buyout would go bankrupt. Factors of interest are deal source, 
financial strength, leverage, industry cyclicality, prevailing economic condition and credit 
market favourability and initial financial distress risk. Overall, the focus of this study is to explain 
determinants of failed LBOs rather than successful ones. Hence, the events of bankruptcy form the 
most prolific data points. All non-bankrupt buyouts, regardless of their eventual return-on-
investment, are considered non-failed. 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
My sample consists of 22,796 leveraged buyouts conducted in the U.S., Canada and Europe 
from 1982 to 2013. The data is derived from Capital IQ database which quite well represents 
the actual population of leveraged buyouts for the period. I determine bankruptcies by using 
multiple sources and methods, and conclude that the sample’s bankruptcy rate (6.1%) is in line 
with previous literature. I assess the determinants of the binary event of bankruptcy with probit 
regressions and apply Heckman sample-selection model to correct misspecification errors for 
the estimates considering scarcely available financial statement information. The analysis of 
initial financial distress risk, measured as Altman Z, is performed with ordinary least squares 
regression. 
FINDINGS OF THE STUDY 
The initial deal source significantly affects the outcome of the buyout. Buyouts of previously 
bankrupted, publicly listed and younger companies are associated with higher bankruptcy rates. 
Meanwhile secondary buyouts, privatizations and cross-border transactions are significantly 
less likely to go bankrupt. Also, management equity participation appears to reduce the risk of 
insolvency. Club deals on the other hand appear to have no significant effect on bankruptcies. 
The results also indicate that financial strength is an important factor in explaining buyout 
bankruptcies. Portfolio firms’ greater ability to convert EBITDA to free cash flow after capital 
expenditures, lower indebtedness, higher interest coverage and higher profitability are 
associated with lower bankruptcy rates. 
Furthermore industry cyclicality, favourable economic conditions and flex credit market appear 
to be associated with higher probability of bankruptcy. Also, strength of creditor rights appears 
to have a very significant effect on the bankruptcy probability.  
Keywords leveraged buyout, bankruptcy, bankruptcy likelihood, cyclicality, financial distress, private 
equity, leverage 
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TUTKIELMAN TAVOITTEET 
Tutkin pro gradu-tutkielmassani määrääviä tekijöitä konkursseille velkarahoitteisissa 
yrityskaupoissa (”LBO”). Keräämällä laajan poikkileikkausaineiston, tavoitteenani on selvittää 
mitkä tekijät vaikuttavat konkurssin tapahtumiseen. Tutkielman kannalta kiinnostavia tekijöitä 
ovat kaupan alkuperä, taloudellinen vahvuus, toimialan syklisyys, kansantalouden tilanne, 
rahoitusmarkkinan myönteisyys ja transaktion lähtökohtainen riskitaso. Tutkielma keskittyy 
epäonnistuneisiin yrityskauppoihin ja kaikkia ei-konkurssiin tai yrityssaneeraukseen päätyneitä 
yhtiötä käsitellään kategorisesti ei-epäonnistuneina.  
DATA JA METODOLOGIA 
Otokseni koostuu 22,796 velkarahoitteisesta yrityskaupasta Yhdysvalloissa, Kanadassa sekä 
Euroopassa toteutetusta aikavälillä 1982-2013. Aineisto perustuu Capital IQ tietokantaan, joka 
edustaa suhteellisen hyvin koko LBO-populaatiota tältä ajalta. Määrittelen yrityskauppojen 
konkurssit useaa lähdettä ja metodia hyödyntäen. Otoksen konkurssiaste (6.1%) on linjassa 
aikaisemman tutkimuksen kanssa. Konkurssi on binäärinen selitettävä muuttuja, jota estimoin 
probit-regressiolla. Lisäksi sovellan Heckmanin otosvalinta-metodia niukasti saatavilla olevaa 
tilinpäätösinformaatiota analysoidessani. Yhtiön tuottavuudesta ja pääomarakenteesta johtavaa 
taloudellista riskiä mittaan Altman Z-luvulla, jota estimoin OLS-regressiolla. 
TULOKSET 
Yrityskaupan alkuperällä on merkittävä vaikutus LBO:n lopputulokseen. Alun perin 
konkurssista ostettujen, pörssilistattujen ja nuorten yhtiöiden LBO:t johtavat todennäköisimmin 
konkurssiin. Toisaalta pääomasijoittajilta ostetut yhtiöt, yksityistämiset ja kansainväliset LBO:t 
päätyvät konkurssiin merkittävästi epätodennäköisemmin. Konkurssiriski on myös pienempi, 
kun johto sijoittaa yhtiöön transaktion yhteydessä.  
Tulokset indikoivat lisäksi taloudellisen vahvuuden vaikuttavan merkittävästi konkurssin 
todennäköisyyteen. Portfolioyhtiöiden kyky konvertoida käyttökate vapaaksi kassavirraksi 
investointien jälkeen, matalampi velkaisuus, korkeampi velanhoitokyky ja korkeampi 
tuottoisuus pienentävät kaikki konkurssin todennäköisyyttä.  
Lisäksi yhtiön toimialan syklisyys, kansantalouden kasvu ja suotuisat rahoitusmarkkinat lisäävät 
konkurssiriskin todennäköisyyttä. Myös velkojien oikeuksien vahvuudella vaikuttaisi olevan 
merkittävä vaikutus konkurssin todennäköisyyteen. 
Avainsanat:  Yrityskauppa, LBO, konkurssi, velkarahoitus, velkavipu, syklisyys, pääomasijoittaminen 
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1. Introduction 
 
During the past three decades, private equity industry has cleared its way to become one of the 
most influential forms of investment management in the world. With the use of operational, 
governance and financial engineering, private equity firms have shaped their portfolio 
companies and consequently resourced them to reach their ambitious growth plans (Strӧmberg, 
2008). In order to execute these actions, private equity firms use a method called a leveraged 
buyout (LBO) where a private equity firm (general partner) acquires a majority share of an 
established company typically for a five-year period using significant leverage and relatively 
little equity. However, LBOs also entail significant risks if projected cash flows fail to 
materialise. In these situations leverage and limited time horizon leave little room for 
turnaround actions, which may be vital to save the company from heading into bankruptcy.  
The underlying motive of the private equity model is to create returns for investors (limited 
partners) who have invested capital in specially structured private equity funds. Leverage 
enables utilisation of tax-shields and may magnify returns of the investment. As LBOs are 
generally characterised by high leverage and bold value creation plans, the risk of a portfolio 
company falling into creditors’ hands also increases significantly after the transaction (Tykvová 
& Borell, 2012). However, leverage alone cannot explain why some buyouts thrive while others 
fail. For example, portfolio firms’ profitability, management capability, cyclicality of the 
business and macro-economic sentiment are also likely to play significant roles in the eventual 
outcome of the buyout. In this thesis I aim to provide further light into the issue by analysing 
differences between bankrupted and non-bankrupted LBOs. By bankruptcy, I refer to events 
where a company has filed for Chapter 11 or Chapter 13 (U.S.), entered into debt reorganisation 
or otherwise gone out of business. Hence, this study does not aim to answer eventual returns of 
LBOs but rather why they have ended up in bankruptcy.  
“The biggest leveraged buyout ever has become one of the largest bankruptcies, as a Texas power 
company succumbed to a lousy bet on natural gas prices and more than $40 billion in debt. Energy 
Future Holdings Corp., the former TXU Corp., filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection Tuesday 
to rework debt that became unsustainable amid hefty losses.” – (Wall Street Journal, April 29th, 
2014) 
“Critics predicted the largest private-equity deals would end up like the giant python in Florida, 
which exploded in 2005 after it hungrily devoured an alligator. During the 2006-07 bubble, buy-
out firms hunted iconic companies at sky-high prices with oodles of borrowed money. Then the 
economy turned. Boston Consulting Group forecast in 2008 that the majority of companies owned 
by private equity would default on their debts.” – (The Economist August 4th, 2012) 
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The private equity industry is characterised by compensation structures based on high return 
expectations. Meanwhile, fierce competition among private equity firms put pressure to also 
provide these superior returns for their investors. Chung et al. (2012) report that the 
performance of a preceding private equity fund significantly affects general partners’ ability to 
raise a follow-on fund. In a hunt for high returns, private equity firms are particularly effective 
in reaping the benefits from for example, leverage, tax shields, intra-firm inefficiencies, credit 
market conditions, economic cycles and distressed valuations (Axelson et al., 2012;  Strӧmberg, 
2008). However, as debt payback is based on uncertain future cash flows, LBOs are particularly 
vulnerable if projections fail to materialise. Hence, it would not be trivial to expect that also a 
significant part of LBOs also become distressed and end up in bankruptcy.  
In my thesis, I construct a large cross-sectional dataset of North American and European LBOs 
conducted during 1982-2013, and aim to explain which factors are associated with the event 
that a LBO goes bankrupt. Factors of particular interest are deal source and type, financial 
strength, leverage, business cyclicality, prevailing economic climate and initial financial 
distress risk.  
The issue is topical. While writing this thesis, Energy Future Holdings (a.k.a TXU), the largest 
buyout ever, applied for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in late April 2014. With the bankruptcy, $6.8 
billion of investors’ (among others KKR and Goldman Sachs) equity capital is most likely 
wiped away and $45.6 billion of debt restructured (Bravo & Jinks, 2014). The LBO, conducted 
in February 2007 was based on the expectation that prices for natural gas set by regulators 
would hike and provide competitive advantage for the company which heavily relied on coal 
to generate power. Instead, after the market turned, prices for natural gas unexpectedly 
collapsed and electricity usage tumbled. These events resulted in Chapter 11 being the only 
option for the company (Carey & Morris, 2012).  
Today, buyout funds globally are sitting on a record amount of $1.19 trillion of dry powder, i.e. 
money committed to private equity funds but yet as uninvested (Johnson, 2014). This vast 
amount of unused capital suggests that competition for upcoming investment opportunities will 
intensify among private equity firms and this is likely to reflect in the form of higher transaction 
prices, lower returns and more investments on less attractive opportunities. Hence, identifying 
macro-economic, deal and firm-specific factors that are associated with higher failure 
likelihoods make a prolific and topical issue for both private equity practitioners and the 
academia. 
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1.1.Key findings from existing literature 
The academic research covering the field of leveraged buyouts has been active. Popular topics 
range from value creation (e.g. Jensen, 1989; Acharya et al., 2008; Valkama et al., 2013), capital 
structures (e.g. Kaplan & Stein, 1993; Axelson et al., 2012) to critical assessment of 
compensation structures and employment effects (e.g. Rappaport, 1989; Rasmussen, 2008; 
Phalippou, 2009).  
However, studies focusing on why LBOs fail are less represented. Among the earliest ones, 
Kaplan & Stein (1993) examine a sample of 124 LBOs of which 23 defaulted on their debt. The 
authors attribute the causes of defaults to leverage, poorly designed capital structures and 
buyout pricing rather than unexpected deteriorations in operational performance. Andrade & 
Kaplan (1998) analyse the cost of financial distress for 28 highly leveraged LBOs that filed for 
bankruptcy. They estimate that the cost of distress to 10 to 20 percent of firm value and that it 
comprises of a fixed component rather than e.g. leverage, capital structure complexity or 
industry performance. Of more recent studies, Strӧmberg (2008) examines general activity, exit 
behaviour and longevity of LBOs globally. On a sample of 21,397 LBOs during 1970-2007, he 
finds that 6% of transactions had exited through bankruptcy/restructuring procedures. 
Considering the amount of leverage in LBOs, the rate is relatively low. Axelson et al. (2012) 
find significant correlation between buyout debt and economy-wide credit conditions, which 
may indirectly influence the bankruptcy likelihood of LBOs. Tykvová & Borell (2012) consider 
a European sample of 1,842 buyouts during 2000-2008 and examine the distress risk of private 
equity backed buyout companies as a function of capital structure, profitability, economic 
climate and private equity investors’ experience. They find that in years when cheap debt 
financing was available, the bankruptcy likelihoods were no different for LBO companies than 
for other companies. Also the authors find that buyouts conducted by experienced private equity 
investors showed lower bankruptcy likelihoods three years after the buyout compared to 
inexperienced investors.  
Finally, Wilson & Wright (2013) study insolvency risk in U.K. buyouts and construct an 
extensive sample of over 9 million U.K. firm-year observations and 25,484 buyouts. The 
authors conduct an in-detail analysis of the impacts of operational ratios, capital structure and 
distress risk on the event of bankruptcy. The authors find that among the three main types of 
buyouts, Management buy-ins (MBIs) have the highest propensity to insolvency. The other two 
types, Management buyouts (MBOs) and private equity backed LBOs, carry higher insolvency 
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risk than the non-buyout population before the legislative change in 2002 in the U.K1. They 
authors find that the likelihood of failure for all firms is associated with higher leverage but is 
more specifically related to interest coverage (capacity to service debt). Also, controlling for 
financial performance and operational risk, private equity backed firms are more able to avoid 
insolvency when they exhibit signs of distress compared to other companies. Furthermore, 
private equity investors appear to choose firms that are initially more likely to generate healthy 
interest coverage ratios.  
1.2.Contribution to existing literature 
My thesis aims to contribute to the previous literature by extending the scope of previous studies 
and validating their key findings with more extensive and global data. This includes: i) analysis 
of the effect of deal source and type, ii) analysis the effect of industry cyclicality, iii) use of 
actual bankruptcy events instead of financial distress likelihood scores (e.g. Altman Z), iiii) 
validation of previous findings regarding the effect of financial ratios and macro-economic data 
by using new and modified variables. In order to observe variation of the effects during different 
time-periods, I split my analyses to multiple sub-periods. In Table 1, I summarise my thesis’ 
positioning compared to closely-related previous studies. Next I will discuss these points in 
more detail. 
Firstly, from a conceptual perspective, previous closely related papers focus on the riskiness of 
LBO companies compared to “normal” non-buyout companies. The findings also provide 
valuable insight for the economic discussion (e.g. Tykvová & Borell, 2012; Wilson & Wright, 
2013). However, I approach the issue from a rather more practical point of view. My aim is to 
identify specific deal types that are more or less likely to fail while simultaneously analysing 
which sort of deals are generally performed with riskier capital structures.  
With my findings, private equity practitioners and lenders may be more able to review their 
investment decisions, recognise potential pitfalls and align appropriate risk metrics as a basis 
of specific deal types, target companies and economic climate. Furthermore, my data consists 
of actual bankruptcy events compared to e.g. Tykvová & Borell (2012) who focus on 
                                                 
1 Enterprise Act 2002 in the U.K. promotes a corporate rescue culture and increases the likelihood of continuation 
of a business as a going concern The act provides creditors more negotiation power and rights, which significantly 
reduced bankruptcy rates in the U.K.. (Wilson & Wright, 2013)  
  5 
bankruptcy likelihood (i.e. Altman Z & Ohlson O). These authors note that the biggest caveat 
in their study is that they do not check whether the company has gone bankrupt or not.  
Secondly, in the analysis of financial strength I test the validity of previous studies’ findings 
and add new cash-flow based variables that are more often used in practice. In more detail, I 
include leverage, profitability and interest coverage ratios to examine their effects on 
bankruptcy. I test the validity of these factors in my data and find supporting evidence for 
previous literature that higher leverage (debt to total assets), lower profitability (return on 
assets) and lower interest coverage (EBIT to interest expenses) are associated with higher 
bankruptcy probabilities. In addition, I include cash-flow based measures for leverage (net debt 
to EBITDA), profitability (EBITDA margin) and a Cash conversion measure which are less 
used in previous studies. Moreover I extend the findings of Acharya et al. (2011) in the context 
of buyout bankruptcies. The authors report that less leverage is used in countries where the potential 
liquidation value is lower (i.e. higher creditor rights). I find that indeed, buyouts in countries with 
higher creditor rights are also significantly less likely to go bankrupt. Finally, as free cash flow is a 
key factor in terms of servicing debt, I add a novel factor “cash conversion” ([EBITDA-Capital 
expenditures]/EBITDA) to measure portfolio company’s ability to convert its profits to free cash 
flow. My results indicate that higher cash conversion is associated with lower probability of 
bankruptcy. One unit increase in cash conversion % decreases the probability of bankruptcy by 
3.6%. For the mean company in the sample, this means an increase from 62.2% to 79.6%. 
Thirdly, in the analysis concerning the effects of different deal types, I include factors such as 
secondary LBO, corporate divestiture and bankruptcy sale. Alperovych et al. (2013) study the 
effects of these vendor source on LBO performance and find that efficiency improves in corporate 
divestitures while secondary buyouts (SBO) provide the lowest potential for improvement. I test 
how these factors behave in the context of buyout bankruptcies and find that despite large 
differences in efficiency improvement, both of these deal types are significantly less likely to go 
bankrupt. Also, I confirm the findings of Strömberg (2008) that buyouts conducted on bankrupted 
companies are more likely to go bankrupt again. Moreover, I test how the findings of Tykvová & 
Borell (2012) in this context. While the authors report that buyouts conducted by experienced 
investors have lower financial distress risks three years after the buyout compared to similar non-
buyout companies, I report that, in effect, buyouts conducted by more experienced investors are 
more likely to go bankrupt. Also, in terms of management participation I find somewhat opposing 
evidence compared to study by Wilson & Wright (2013) who report that management buyouts 
(MBO) and management buy-ins have significantly higher failure rates in the U.K compared to 
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other buyouts. My results indicate that when management has participated in the buyout in the form 
of equity, the buyout is less likely to go bankrupt. However, the effect is small and not consistently 
significant across time periods. Moreover, I add novel deal types such as Going private and Cross-
border transactions and find that both buyouts of previously public firms and foreign firms are less 
likely to go bankrupt. 
Fourthly, in terms of macro-economic factors I study the effects of current economic state and 
credit markets. These factors are well covered in the studies of e.g. Tykvová & Borell (2012), 
Wilson & Wright (2013) and Axelson et al. (2012). However, the cyclicality of the target firm’s 
underlying business is not covered in any of these studies. As LBO debt structures are often 
aggressively geared and rely on the projected cash flows to also materialize, unexpected swings 
in the economy should have a greater impact on performance of more cyclical companies. 
Hence, I add a novel cyclicality variable, which measures the correlation of the portfolio 
company’s industry demand with local GDP. I find that, depending on the state of the economy, 
cyclicality has a significant effect on buyout bankruptcy. 
  7 
 
Table 1 – Thesis’ positioning compared to closely-related previous studies 
Contribution 
Kaplan & Stein 
(1993) 
Andrade & 
Kaplan (1998) 
Strӧmberg 
(2008) 
Tykvová & 
Borell (2012) 
Axelson et al. 
(2012) 
Wilson & 
Wright (2013) 
My thesis 
(2014) 
Focus Defaults in LBOs Cost of distress in 
LBOs 
Exit route and 
longevity of LBOs 
Financial distress: 
LBOs vs non-
buyouts 
LBO leverage and 
credit availability 
Insolvency and 
financial distress: 
LBOs vs non-
buyouts 
LBO 
bankruptcies: 
bankrupted vs 
non-bankrupted 
Sample size 124 LBOs 24 LBOs 21,397 LBOs  1,842 LBOs  1,157 LBOs 25,484 LBOs 22,796 LBOs  
Time period 1980-1989 1989-1992 1970-2007 2000-2008 1980-2008 1995-2010 1982-2013 
Geographic reach U.S. U.S. U.S, Can & Eur Europe U.S, Can & Eur U.K. U.S, Can & Eur 
Main data source Securities data 
corporation 
SEC documents, 
Compustat 
Capital IQ Orbis Capital IQ, LPC, 
Dealscan 
U.K. company 
filing statutory 
Capital IQ 
Dependent variables Buyout price, debt 
repayment, debt 
type, recaps 
Leverage, interest 
coverage, 
profitability 
Descriptive study Financial distress 
(Altman Z, 
Ohlson O) 
Leverage Insolvency, 
financial distress  
Bankruptcy, 
financial distress 
(Altman Z) 
Explanatory variables 
Deal source/type n.a. n.a. Public-to-private, 
bankruptcy sale, 
syndicated deal, 
carve-out 
Syndicated deal, 
investor 
experience 
Carveout, public-
to-private, 
secondary buyout, 
privatisation, 
bankruptcy sale, 
fund size,  
MBO/MBI/LBO, 
family company 
Same as 
Strömberg + 
cross-border, man. 
participation, 
SBO, investor 
experience, 
privatisation 
Cyclicality Yes n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. Yes 
Financial ratios Balance sheet and 
cash-flow based 
Balance sheet and 
cash-flow based 
n.a. Balance sheet 
based 
Balance sheet 
based 
Balance sheet 
based 
Cash-flow based, 
balance sheet 
based 
Market factors Market pricing Credit market Credit market Credit market, 
GDP, credit 
tightening 
Credit  and stock 
market 
Herfindahl-
Hirschman 
Creditor rights, 
credit market, 
economy  
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1.3.Key research questions 
Overall, the focus of this study is to explain determinants of failed LBOs rather than successful 
ones. Hence, the events of bankruptcy form the most prolific data points. All non-bankrupt 
buyouts, regardless of their eventual return-on-investment (even if highly negative), are 
considered non-failed.  
I approach the issue from three angles. Firstly, I examine the effects of deal type (such as vendor 
source and buyer experience) on the bankruptcy probability and initial financial distress risk of 
the buyout. Secondly, I analyse how specific target firm characteristics (such as cyclicality, 
capital structure and profitability) are associated with the probability of bankruptcy. Thirdly, I 
assess the influence of exogenous factors (such as the economic climate and credit market 
favourability), which are independent of the private equity firm and the portfolio company. The 
empirical tests are further divided into separate subgroups in order to assess the significance of 
variables across time-periods. This framework facilitates the following research questions: 
I. Do different deal sources and types affect the probability of a buyout going bankrupt? 
 
II. Do private equity investor(s)’ experience, share of knowledge and management 
participation impact the probability of a buyout going bankrupt? 
 
III. What is the impact of a portfolio company’s cyclicality, leverage and financial strength 
on the probability of it going bankrupt? 
 
IV. Do favourable credit markets and positive macro-economic development increase the 
probability of a buyout going bankrupt? 
 
1.4.Main findings 
The analysed dataset consists of 14,602 transactions conducted during 1994-2009. LBOs prior 
to year 1994 lack the necessary information for most control variables and hence transactions 
performed during 1982-1994 mainly serve only descriptive purposes. Transactions after 2009 
are excluded from the analysis in order to allow most recent buyouts some time to go bankrupt. 
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The number of findings is high due to the large number of factors that influence the success or 
failure of buyouts.  
Among key findings, I report that different deal sources and types significantly affect the 
outcome of the buyout. Among the riskiest transactions, regardless of their capital structures, 
buyouts that are acquired from bankruptcy proceedings are some 10% more likely to go 
bankrupt compared to buyouts generally. Moreover, if the portfolio company has been publicly 
listed before the LBO, the probability of bankruptcy is some 3% higher. On the safer front, 
secondary buyouts are 2% less likely to go bankrupt. This indicates that despite secondary 
buyouts’ generally lower upside potential (Alperovych et al., 2013), these deals can also be 
considered to be of better quality and lower risk. Results suggest that SBOs are also generally 
performed with even riskier capital structures and hence they can be considered as more solid 
credit cases for lenders. Also, interestingly the results on cross-border transactions indicate 2% 
lower bankruptcy probability while intuitively one might expect higher risk from information 
asymmetry in these transactions. One reason may be that risks are more thoroughly analysed in 
cross-border transactions and hence show lower bankruptcy probabilities. 
On the analysis covering the effects of the economic climate and cyclicality, the results provide 
consistent evidence that buyouts conducted during favourable economic conditions are more likely 
to go bankrupt. The favourability of credit market appears to be associated with higher leverage and 
hence higher probability of bankruptcy. Also, I report that the cyclicality of the underlying business 
is associated with higher bankruptcy probability for the sample period 1994-2009 despite LBOs 
having lower initial financial distress risk. 
Finally, for the analysis including financial ratios, my results indicate that higher leverage 
significantly increases the probability of bankruptcy while higher interest coverage (calculated as 
EBIT/Interest expenses) decreases the probability. Moreover, companies that have higher cash 
conversion are less likely to go bankrupt. If portfolio firms can manage with lower capital 
expenditures, they are generally also more able to service their debt. Another interesting finding is 
that the strength of portfolio company country’s creditor rights appears to significantly decrease the 
probability of bankruptcy. This is line with Acharya et al. (2011) who report that less leverage is 
used in countries where creditor rights are higher.  
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1.5.Limitations of the study 
The main caveat of the study is that only buyouts that have filed for bankruptcy are considered 
as failed ones. In the event of distress, private equity firms often inject additional equity in order 
to save the company from bankruptcy. In case a portfolio firm still has a viable equity story, 
additional equity injection can save the firm from bankruptcy and shelter private equity firms 
from reputational losses and hampered lender-relationships. A case in point in the data can be 
found from perhaps the most famous LBO ever conducted, the $25 billion buyout of RJR 
Nabisco in 1988. Private equity firm Kohlberg, Kravis and Roberts (KKR) acquired the 
company with $1.5 billion of equity and financed the rest with debt including $6 billion of reset 
notes whose interest rate depended on the market value of those notes (Carey & Morris, 2012). 
By the spring of 1990 the rate of those notes had jumped from 13.71% to 25% resulting in a 
liquidity crisis and leaving KKR with only one option to stave off from filing to Chapter 11. 
KKR eventually invested additional $1.7 billion of equity to bail out the company and 
successfully exited during 1994. However, in my data this transaction is simply considered as 
“non-bankrupt” despite the fact that without additional equity the buyout would have ended up 
in bankruptcy.  
Another limitation also relates to the classification of whether the buyout has ended up in 
bankruptcy or not. Capital IQ has a distinct bankruptcy database for U.S. transactions, which 
enables me to reliably assign bankruptcies for transactions that the database covers. Moreover, 
by matching M&A transactions labelled as “bankruptcy sale”, I can safely determine 
bankruptcies for transactions which are acquired by another entity after the portfolio company 
has filed for bankruptcy. However, for the rest of the transactions I mainly rely on company 
status codes. Capital IQ and Orbis provide information for the company’s current status; for 
example whether the company is operating, in bankruptcy or under restructuring proceedings. 
If the company is classified as bankrupt by the company status code, I can conclude bankruptcy 
by checking that the last owner of the company prior to bankruptcy also matches with the 
private equity firm that conducted the transaction. However, an issue arises if the company after 
bankruptcy reorganisation (Chapter 11 in the U.S.) is able to continue its operations under the 
same ownership and the bankruptcy is not reported in the Capital IQ bankruptcy database. In 
these special cases the data is likely to be flawed. Nevertheless, the bankruptcy rates of my data 
are in line with the paper of Strӧmberg (2008) who, also using Capital IQ data, conducts 
extensive manual web searches to determine the eventual fate of buyouts in his sample. 
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A third limitation is the availability of financial statement information for portfolio companies. 
Financials are needed for the analysis regarding the effect of capital structures and profitability. 
Due to the private nature of post-LBO portfolio companies, Capital IQ provides adequate 
financials for only 709 buyouts (5% of the population during the analysis period). In order to 
control this issue, I apply Heckman sample selection methodology, which adjusts the error 
terms in the regression to take into account the missing observations.  
Finally, in some cases buyout bankruptcy can be intentional and value-adding for the private 
equity firm. For example, if the portfolio company’s value is more valuable in parts rather than 
as a combined entity, distinct business units can be divested separately and the parent company 
ran down. 
1.6.Structure of the thesis 
The structure of the thesis is as follows. Chapter 2 provides a general overview of the private 
equity industry, how it has developed and basic concepts of the private equity model. For a 
reader unfamiliar with leveraged buyouts, understanding the concepts introduced in the chapter 
facilitates a broader understanding of the topic. Chapter 3 presents academic literature related 
to the economic role, value creation and financial distress in LBOs. In chapter 4, I discuss my 
hypotheses. Chapter 5 presents the data and descriptive statistics. Chapter 6 provides 
methodology and results of the analyses. Finally, in chapter 7, I conclude key findings of my 
analyses and suggest areas for future research. 
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2. Private equity and leveraged buyouts 
In this section, I introduce the basic concepts of the private equity model and how it has evolved 
during the past three decades. The concept of private equity is rather distinct from the more 
“traditional” forms of financial economics, such as corporate finance or investment 
management. Hence, for a non-practitioner or non-academic, a thorough understanding of 
related literature and this thesis might require drilling into key definitions and structures of 
leveraged buyouts that are introduced in this chapter. 
Firstly, I discuss the three very distinct boom and bust periods that the relatively young private 
equity industry has gone through. The impact of these periods are clearly observable in 
descriptive statistics presented in Chapter 5 and in the results of analyses in Chapter 6. 
Secondly, I describe the structure of the private equity model and key definitions.  
2.1.Overview of the private equity market 
2.1.1. Private equity model briefly 
A leveraged buyout (LBO) can generally be described as a transaction where a target company 
is acquired by a specialised investment firm. The transaction is financed with a relatively small 
share of equity and a relatively large portion of debt financing. Typically in a LBO the private 
equity firm acquires a majority share of an existing firm. Another distinct form, closely related 
to private equity, is venture capital (VC) where the VC firm typically invests in young or 
emerging start-up companies with a minority share and little or no debt is used. (Kaplan & 
Strӧmberg, 2008) 
A private equity firm, also referred to as General Partner (GP), raises equity capital through a 
private equity fund. These funds are “close-end” vehicles where investors, also referred to as 
Limited Partners (LP), commit capital for a fixed period to finance the fund’s investments 
managed by the GP. The typical investment period for a private equity fund is ten years, where 
the GP spends first five years acquiring portfolio firms and the subsequent five years developing 
and eventually selling those firms for a profit. For its services the GP collects fixed and variable 
fees from the fund and portfolio companies. (Phalippou, 2009) 
By their legal form, private equity funds are organized as limited partnerships where the GPs 
manage the fund and the LPs provide majority of the capital. The LPs typically include 
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institutional investors, such as corporate and public pension funds, endowments, banks and 
insurance companies and wealthy individuals. It is customary that the GP provides at least 1 
percent of the total capital. (Kaplan & Strӧmberg, 2008) 
2.1.2. Historical booms and busts of leveraged buyouts 
Leveraged buyouts emerged as a significant phenomenon in the U.S. during 1980s. Since its 
inception, the private equity industry has experienced three distinguishable boom and bust 
cycles which have formed the industry to what it is today. In 1991, new leveraged buyout 
transactions amounted to $7.5 billion (Acharya et al., 2007) later peaking to a record $831 
billion in 2007 (Pitchbook, 2014). In this thesis, I divide my analyses into separate time-period-
wise subgroups in order to examine how the determinants of leveraged buyouts bankruptcies 
have varied over these rather different time periods.  
The concept of a leveraged buyout became a well-known phenomenon in Wall Street in 1978, 
when a then-little-known investment firm Kohlberg Kravis & Roberts (KKR) acquired 
Houdaille Industries, a struggling industrial pumps maker with $380 million using only $12 
million of its own money. The extraordinary small share of equity enabled KKR to reach 
stratospheric returns if the buyout succeeded while much of the downside risk was carried by 
lenders. Following the transaction, numerous new private equity firms emerged and opted to 
pursue magnified returns with similar LBO methods. Private equity firms succeeded in raising 
vast amounts of capital from institutional investors who were attracted by the superior returns 
LBOs could offer. The dramatic surge of leverage buyout activity was supported by the raise 
of junk bond financing. This resulted in the private equity industry’s first boom cycle, enduring 
from 1982 to an eventual bust in 1993 when the junk bond market shut down. The boom 
culminated in 1988 to the $25 billion buyout of RJR Nabisco. (Carey & Morris, 2012) 
Jensen (1989) predicted that the LBO organisational form would eventually become the 
dominant corporate organizational structure. He praises private equity firms’ inner ability to 
combine concentrated ownership companies, align high-powered incentives for their 
investment professionals, and structure lean and efficient organisations with minimal overhead 
costs. The private equity firm aligns portfolio company management’s incentives with 
performance-based compensation, applies highly leveraged capital structures and introduces 
active governance. Jensen argues that these structures are superior compared to public 
companies with dispersed ownership, low leverage and weak corporate governance. Generally 
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private equity firms’ primary objective is to develop the company in a friendly collaboration 
with the target company’s management. However, less complimentary terms such as “corporate 
raiders” and “hostile takeovers” were commonly used to describe the buyout practitioners 
(Kaplan & Strӧmberg, 2008).  
The first buyout boom period was, for the most part, U.S., Canadian and U.K., phenomenon. 
From 1985-89, transactions conducted in these three countries accounted for 89% of global 
buyouts and 93% of global transaction value. The nature of LBOs was dominated by the 
relatively large public-to-private transactions in mature industries, such as manufacturing and 
retail. These transactions comprised close to 50% of the value of all LBOs. This contributed to 
the general perception that LBOs equal going-private transactions of large firms in mature 
industries. However, in 1990 the shutdown of the junk bond market, which had multiplied debt-
levels in LBOs, signalled an end for the first LBO boom. As a result, large number of leveraged 
buyouts defaulted on their debt payments and filed for bankruptcy. Eventually, the buyouts of 
public companies practically disappeared in the early 1990s. (Kaplan & Strӧmberg, 2008) 
Kaplan & Stein (1993) analyse the collapse of the LBO market and suggest that the crash was 
mainly due to five distinct reasons. Firstly, the ample availability of debt caused the transaction 
prices to inflate substantially. Secondly, debt levels swell abruptly comprising of as much as 
more than 90% of total capital. Thirdly, banks began to tighten terms on principal repayments, 
which deteriorated firms’ ability to service their immense load of debt. Fourthly, junk bonds 
replaced more flexible private subordinated debt and bank debt while the use of strip-financing 
techniques declined2. Finally, as much of the junk bond-type debt was sold to private investors, 
distressed firms’ ability to negotiate debt repayments deteriorated greatly. 
However, already in 1992 LBOs began to re-emerge. While the public-to-private buyouts 
practically disappeared, private equity firms nevertheless continued to purchase private 
companies and divisions of them. Buyouts of private companies spread to new industries such 
as ICT, financial services and healthcare, while manufacturing and retail firms no longer 
resembled the most dominant buyout targets. Even though the aggregate transaction value fell, 
the amount of deals undertaken doubled in 1990–94 compared to 1985–89. The second buyout 
                                                 
2 Junk bonds have a non-investment grade status, often including payment-in-kind (PIK) provisions. Strip 
financing is the repackaging of different types of obligations into one security. In a situation where an acquisition 
is financed with strip-financing and the company begins to default on loans, investors are more willing to 
renegotiate lending terms, thus avoiding the hold-up problem often seen in prior to and during bankruptcy. See for 
example (Kaplan & Stein, 1993) 
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boom ultimately culminated in the Dot-com bubble in 1999 and 2000, and along with its burst, 
the LBO market again crashed. (Kaplan & Strӧmberg, 2008) 
In mid-2000s, credit markets were overflowing with liquidity and hedge funds emerged as 
important financiers for leveraged buyouts. As a result, the third and biggest, leveraged buyout 
boom period was set to begin. Public-to-private transactions started to reappear; record amounts 
of capital were committed to private equity, both in nominal terms and as a fraction of the 
overall stock market (Kaplan & Strӧmberg, 2008). In February 2007, the credit market 
facilitated KKR, Goldman Sachs and other investors to acquire Energy Future Holdings for $45 
billion, making it the largest buyout in history.  However, the boom finally ended in the collapse 
of the sub-prime market in June of 2007, which had fuelled an unprecedented supply of leverage 
throughout the whole global financial system (Acharya et al., 2007). Despite the risks that high 
leverage impose, Wilson et al. (2012) find that before and during the global recession, private 
equity backed buyouts achieved not only superior economic and financial performance 
compared to similar non-portfolio firms, but also positive employment growth. 
Today, private equity has become a global phenomenon having spread to all corners of Europe, 
Asia, Australia and other parts of the world. In 2013, the total transaction value of private 
equity-backed LBOs amounted to $700 billion (Pitchbook, 2014), however still lower than the 
peak in 2007.  
According to Bain & Company (2014), in 2013 the circumstances for LBOs were more 
lucrative than ever. The market was characterised by a record year of fundraising since the 
global financial crisis, $356 billion of new fund capital earmarked for buyouts (near all-time 
high), near zero interest rates, yield-hungry investors and banks eager to lend. However, as the 
industry is sitting on record amounts of uninvested capital, the competition for attractive 
investment opportunities will intensify while higher transaction prices eat up a significant share 
of profits. This might encourage struggling private equity firms to make aggressive bets. As a 
result, an increasing number of buyouts could also end up in bankruptcy in the coming years. 
2.2.Private equity model 
In this section, I introduce the basic concepts and definitions of the private equity model. For a 
reader non-familiar with private equity and leveraged buyouts, this section provides basic 
knowledge in order to achieve a deeper understanding of the analyses in latter sections. 
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2.2.1. Private equity investment mix 
Private equity firms can invest through a mix of investment strategies depending on the firm’s 
size, state, strategy, industry and transaction expertise. Of these, this paper focuses on private 
equity-backed leveraged buyouts. 
Leveraged buyout (LBO) refers to an acquisition of an operating company financed with a 
significant amount of borrowed funds. Value is created by realising opportunities and 
improving efficiencies with the use of debt as financial leverage. Venture capital (VC) considers 
typically smallish investments in companies that are early stage of development and cash flow 
negative. Growth capital typically considers minority share investments in equity and/or debt 
instruments as these companies are growing and require increasing amounts of working capital, 
capital expenditures or add-on acquisitions. Mezzanine financing relates to investments in the 
form of subordinated debt or preferred equity. By nature, mezzanine falls between equity and 
senior debt on the balance sheet. Distressed buyout considers investments in equity or debt 
securities of financially distressed companies with the aims of corporate restructuring or 
turnaround business. Investors in this field are often referred to as “vulture investors” 
(Cumming, 2009) 
2.2.2. Buyout transaction types 
LBOs can be further divided into separate sub-groups. These are distinct by the nature of the 
acquiring party. 
An institutional buyout (IBO) refers to a leveraged buyout conducted by an institutional 
investor, such as a private equity firm or a venture capital firm. Typically the IBO investor aims 
to sell its stake in the company within a certain time period. In a typical LBO, the private equity 
firm involved in the IBO will take charge in structuring and exiting the deal as well as hiring 
managers. A management buyout (MBO) refers to a transaction where a company’s existing 
managers acquire a majority or the complete shares outstanding of the company from the parent 
company or private owners. A management buy-in (MBI) is a transaction where an outside 
management raises the necessary financing, acquires the company and becomes the company’s 
new management. Management buy-ins typically take place when outside investors believe the 
firm's products could generate greater profits through a change in strategy or optimised capital 
structure. A secondary buyout (SBO) is a form of LBO where the both vendor and acquiring 
company are financial sponsors or private equity firms. SBO investors often seek returns from 
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when the selling firm has already realised significant gains or is forced to sell the company due 
to distress, and the second private equity firm can have greater benefits to the firm being bought 
and sold. (Metrick & Yasuda, 2011) 
2.2.3. Key stakeholders 
A private equity firm, also referred to as General Partner (GP), is an investment management 
company that makes investments into portfolio companies on the behalf of the private equity 
fund where it has raised capital from outside investors. Investments are by nature private and 
illiquid, and are conducted through various investment strategies, including leveraged buyouts, 
venture capital and growth capital (Metrick & Yasuda, 2011). The key differences between 
private equity firms and other investment fund managers, such as mutual funds and hedge funds, 
is that private equity funds acquire a majority share and actively influence actions of the 
management of the portfolio companies. The most prominent private equity firms are 
Blackstone, Carlyle and Kohlberg Kravis Robers & Co (KKR). Jensen (1989) describes private 
equity firms as lean, decentralized organizations with relatively few investment professionals 
and employees. 
Private equity investors, also referred to as limited partners (LP), make investments into the 
private equity fund. Limited partners are generally large institutions such as pension funds, 
sovereign wealth funds, endowments, banks, insurance companies or wealthy individuals.  
Private equity funds are funds whose strategy is to predominantly acquire majority stakes in 
established companies. They are typically structured as limited partnerships, where the LPs 
provide most of the capital while the GP manages the actual investments. In contrast to mutual 
funds, private equity funds are mostly “closed-end” funds, meaning that after having committed 
capital, the limited partners cannot cash out their investment before the fund closes (Kaplan & 
Strӧmberg, 2008). Figure 1 illustrates a typical private equity fund structure. Successful private 
equity firms stay in business by raising a new fund every three to five years (Metrick & Yasuda, 
2010). 
Private equity firms often arrange syndicates among multiple buyout firms to bid for a particular 
company. Partners in these so-called “club deals” co-invest in the firm and share a joint payoff. 
Potential benefits arise from the share of expertise, diversification of risk and improved access 
to debt financing. (Officer et al., 2010) 
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Figure  1 – Typical private equity fund structure 
 
2.2.4. Fund lifespan and transaction process 
The typical private equity fund has a fixed life, usually ten years, but can be extended into 
additional years. The GP generally devotes one year for fundraising. After the fund inception, 
the first five years form an investment period, where the GP invests the capital committed into 
portfolio companies. Finally the rest of the fund’s lifetime is dedicated to return the capital to 
investors. The fund agreement imposes restrictions and covenants on the investment strategy. 
Typical covenants limit the amount of capital invested in a single company, types of securities 
and maximum debt at the fund level (Kaplan & Strӧmberg, 2008).  
The private equity firm can raise the capital on a deal-by-deal basis (ex post financing), all at 
once to finance a number of future projects (ex ante financing) or as a combination of these. Ex 
ante financing fund structure has the benefits of aligning the compensation of the GP to the 
collective performance of the fund and limits the GP’s incentive from investing in bad deals. 
For these reasons the ex ante fund structure dominates deal-by-deal capital raising. (Axelson et 
al., 2009) 
Figure 2 depicts a typical lifespan of a private equity fund. Once capital commitments from LPs 
have been collected the GP can begin to make investments. When a suitable target company is 
identified, the GP sends an offer to the company’s owners. The offer can typically be made 
Portfolio company 1
Portfolio company 2
Portfolio company 3
Carried interest / 
management fee
Private equity firm
(General partner)
Investors 
(Limited partners)
Capital
Services
Private equity fund
Capital interest
This figure depicts a typical private equity fund structure. Private equity firm raises capital from 
investors into a specially structured private equity fund and uses this capital accompanied with debt 
financing to acquire portfolio companies. In return for their services, private equity firm is often 
compensated in the form of performance-based carried interest and fixed management fee. Limited 
partners receive return for their investments as capital interest from the private equity fund when the 
investments are exited. 
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under an exclusivity agreement3, as a syndicated club deal among multiple private equity funds 
or through an auction. Private equity firms often require contractual provisions, such as board 
seats, veto rights and other contingent control rights, which enable controlling the management 
of the company. (Cumming, 2009; Metrick & Yasuda, 2011; Kaplan & Strӧmberg, 2008) 
If the offer is accepted, the GP makes a capital call or drawdown and the LPs have to deliver 
their pledged share of capital to finance the investment. The investors’ equity capital and debt 
arranged for the particular transaction to finance the acquisition are placed in a newly 
established holding company. From here, the fund pays off previous owners and commits 
payments to the company’s creditors. In large transactions, a series of holding companies might 
be placed on top of each other, partly for tax timing reasons and partly because this enables 
differential treatment among different creditors. In order to service the holding company’s debt, 
the portfolio company might be under significant pressure to generate sufficient profits to 
enable debt service payments. An alternative, though not preferable, solution could be to call 
in further capital from the fund’s investors. (Cumming, 2009), (Metrick & Yasuda, 2011), 
(Kaplan & Strӧmberg, 2008) 
The year when the private equity fund makes its first investment is referred to as the vintage 
year. Investors often compare funds of the same vintage, since the broader market has an effect 
on a fund’s performance (Kelly, 2012).  
                                                 
3 Exclusivity provision grants the private equity provider an exclusivity period during which the seller or 
management agree not to negotiate with anybody else in relation to the transaction. 
  20 
Figure  2 – Typical private equity fund lifespan 
 
2.2.5. Deal financing 
A LBO is typically financed with 60 to 90 percent of debt. The debt often includes a portion of 
senior and secured debt arranged by banks, in addition to a portion of junior, unsecured debt 
either in the form of high-yield bond or mezzanine debt4. For the remaining part of the purchase 
                                                 
4 Mezzanine debt is subordinated to senior debt and provides financial flexibility by having embedded equity 
instruments, which increase the value of debt. 
Year 0
• The general partner devotes about a year in collecting capital 
commitments from the limited partners
Years 1-5
• Sourcing of deal flow - the general partner devotes the first five years 
identifying and investing in companies
1st
transaction 
(= fund’s 
vintage year)
1) The general partner identifies a potential target company
2) The GP sends an offer to acquire the target company from current 
owners
3) Having obtained an acceptance, the GP arranges a holding company 
(“HoldCo”) and injects part of the private equity funds in order to 
conduct the takeover
4) Previous owners of the target company are bought out, and (a 
portion of) current debt in target company is paid back
Years 5-10
Target company
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• Tranche A
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• Tranche C
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• High yield debt
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institutional 
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High-yield 
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Private equity 
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• After a certain period of managing and improving portfolio 
companies, the GP decides to exit its investments either through an 
IPO, a trade sale or a SBO
• Having exited all its target companies, the private equity fund closes 
and proceeds are returned to limited partners
Structure of the holding company
This figure depicts a typical private equity fund lifespan and structure of the holding company through 
which the private equity fund makes investments. 
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price, the GP invests capital from the private equity fund. Typically, also the post-buyout 
management team is invited to inject capital into the investment. (Kaplan & Strӧmberg, 2008) 
Axelson et al. (2012) study the financial structures of LBOs during 1980 to 2008 and find that 
senior debt constitutes on average 69% of capital. The total debt is further divided into 72.5% 
senior bank debt (including term and bridge loans), 12.4% subordinated debt (e.g. vendor note 
or mezzanine) and 11.6% bonds. The average leverage (Debt to EBITDA5) is 5.6x while an 
average Enterprise value to EBITDA-multiple paid for transactions is 8.2x. Figure 3, presents 
an example of a typical LBO financial structure.  
Figure  3  - Typical private equity buyout 
The figure depicts a typical private equity buyout structure using an example of the August 2005 
secondary buyout of Kwik-Fit. The total transaction value equals £774 million, of which £582.5 (75%) 
is financed with debt. The total debt is, in the order of seniority, divided into senior debt (term loans A-
C), 2nd lien junior debt and mezzanine financing. The maturities and interest rates (spread over LIBOR) 
are presented on the right hand side. PIK stands for “payments-in-kind”. Adapted from (Axelson et al., 
2012). 
 
2.2.6. Performance metrics 
Private equity fund returns are commonly reported on a portfolio level as Internal Rate of 
Returns (IRR) and Total Value to Paid-in Capital (TVPI). Given nature of private equity funds’ 
                                                 
5 EBITDA stands for Earnings Before Interest Taxes Depreciations and Amortisations. It reflects the company’s 
cash flow and is often used as it is independent from variations in capital structures. 
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lifecycle, it not feasible to measure performance with annualised returns, but rather use 
measurement on a since-inception basis (SI-IRR). IRR takes into account the timing of cash 
flows and is relatively straightforward to interpret. Other performance metrics include a 
combination of multiples, such as, Distributed to Paid-in Capital (DPI), Residual Value to Paid-
In Capital (RVPI) and Paid-in to Committed Capital (PIC). (Cumming, 2009) 
Kaplan & Schoar (2005), using data from Venture Economics, report an average IRR of 19% 
for buyout funds and 17% for venture capital funds. Chung et al. (2012), using data from Preqin, 
report similar results; a mean IRR is 16.5% for buyout funds and 14.1% for venture capital 
funds. Kaplan & Schoar (2005) find strong evidence that performance by a private equity firm 
in one fund predicts performance by the firm’s subsequent funds. Furthermore Chung et al. 
(2012) find that the performance of the preceding fund is positively correlated with the 
probability of the private equity firm raising a subsequent fund.  
2.2.7. Compensation structure 
The private equity firms are compensated through a fixed revenue component management fee, 
and a variable performance-dependent revenue component carried interest. In addition to these, 
private equity firms may charge transaction and monitoring fees. In general, the private equity 
fee structure is particularly lucrative for GPs since a bulk of the revenue is paid regardless of 
the performance. Thus, the fixed revenue component allows the general partners to collect 
millions as fees even with negative yield from the investments. Metrick & Yasuda (2010) find 
that approximately two-thirds of the total revenues come in the form of fixed-revenue and about 
one-third as variable-revenue.  
The terms of the fee structures vary considerably between different fund agreements and require 
some further scrutiny. Over the fund’s lifetime, some of the committed capital, which LPs have 
injected into the fund, is used to pay the management fees and the remainder to make 
investments. The committed capital comprises of lifetime fees and invested capital, which is the 
portion of committed capital invested into portfolio companies. Net investment capital refers to 
investment capital less the cost basis of any exited investments. (Metrick & Yasuda, 2011) 
Historically, the most common method to assess management fees is to pay a constant 
percentage of committed capital. Over the recent years funds have adopted a decreasing fee 
structure where for example the fee percentage decreases 25 basis points per year after fund’s 
first five-year investment period. The fee structure can also use a constant rate which changes 
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the basis from committed capital to the net investment capital after the five year investment 
period. Finally, another common alternative the fee schedule applies both a decreasing fee 
percentage and a change from committed capital to net investment capital after the investment 
period. (Metrick & Yasuda, 2011) 
GPs can also earn variable, performance-based, revenue in the form of carried interest. The 
carried interest is based on four different components: carry level, carry basis, carry hurdle and 
carry timing. The carry level defines the percentage of profits (often 20%) that is claimed by 
the GP. Carry basis defines the basis of capital (e.g. committed/invested) on which the profits 
are measured. Carry hurdle refers to the limit of return which the GP must provide to LPs before 
it is entitled to collect any carried interest. Carry timing governs the timing of carried interest 
distributions. (Metrick & Yasuda, 2011) 
Metrick & Yasuda (2010) study the economics of 144 private equity buyout funds and provide 
insight into common fee structures charged by private equity firms. The most common initial 
management fee level is 2% of committed capital. 84% of buyout funds switch to the basis to 
invested capital and 45% lower their fee level after the investment period. 39% of funds apply 
both of these concessions. Based on these, the median level of lifetime fees for buyout funds 
equals 12% of committed capital. Moreover, with respect to variable performance-dependent 
fees, all buyout funds use 20% as their carry level, 83% use committed capital as a carry basis, 
93% use a hurdle rate of which three-quarters of funds set the hurdle rate equal to 8%. Majority 
of funds also include a carry catch-up clause where the GP is entitled to receive all the returns 
after the 8% hurdle rate until the GP’s compensation equals 20% share of the fund’s returns. 
Additional return is divided by the GP and LPs at a 20/80 ratio. 
Finally, GPs may charge transaction and monitoring fees. Whenever portfolio companies are 
acquired or sold, the GP charges transaction fees, by nature similar to M&A advisory fees, 
directly to the portfolio company. Approximately 85% of buyout fund agreements require that 
GPs share some portion of the transaction fees with LPs. Furthermore, monitoring fees may be 
charged to compensate funds for time and effort spent in working with their portfolio 
companies. Usually these fees are also shared, with LPs receiving 80% and GPs 20%. (Metrick 
& Yasuda, 2010) 
Phalippou (2009) criticises the fee structure of private equity funds. He claims that the use of 
IRR to measure returns creates an incentive for GPs to shorten the holding period of the 
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investment in order to increase their incentive fees. Secondly, some fund agreements include a 
provision of capital reinvestment for investments shorter than 18 months, which again would 
incentivise the GPs to pursue shorter investment horizons. Thirdly, the transaction fees may 
make the GPs prefer larger deals. Finally, as funds report only the IRR instead of effective rate 
of return, the GPs are motivated to distribute large dividends to the fund early in the investment 
horizon. 
2.2.8. Exit channels 
Due to the limited lifetime of buyout funds, investments have to be realised within the 
investment horizon. While corporations are also active in buyout markets, their investment 
criteria differs greatly from private equity investors, due to corporations’ greater emphasis on 
synergies and eternal investment horizon. Exits can be organised through a trade sale to a larger 
corporation, sale of the portfolio company to a subsequent private equity investor or through 
sale to the public markets as an initial public offering (IPO).  
Strӧmberg (2008) reports that the most common exit route for private equity and MBO deals is 
a trade sale to another corporation, which accounts 38% of all exits. The second most common 
exit route is a secondary buyout (24%). IPOs account for 13% of exits and their importance as 
an exit route appears to have decreased over time. Bankruptcies form 6% of exits. 
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3. Related literature 
In this chapter, I discuss the academic literature related to economic role, value creation and 
financial distress and bankruptcy laws regarding LBOs. Firstly, I discuss the economic role of 
private equity. Secondly, I describe the sources of value creation in the private equity model as 
means of operational, financial and governance engineering. Thirdly, I discuss the determinants 
of financial distress in LBOs. Fourthly, I introduce the foundation of creditor rights and discuss 
the economic impact of different bankruptcy laws. These form the theoretical background and 
framework for the empirical section in this thesis. 
3.1.Economic discussion of private equity 
The rapid growth of private equity and leveraged buyouts has yielded many success stories, 
such as Hertz buyout in 20056, but the industry has also attracted considerable attention among 
policymakers, the media and unions. The concerns arise particularly from the view that 
leveraged buyouts are characterised by conflicts of interest, profit-seeking activity, short-term 
horizons, reductions in employment, and increased risk of insolvency especially in an economic 
downturn (Wilson et al., 2012; Union, 2007). The academic discussion on the economic effects 
of LBO ownership is generally divided into two opposing strains. 
Jensen (1989), one of the most cited supporters of private equity, argues that “The publicly held 
corporation has outlived its usefulness in many sectors of the economy. [...]Active investors are 
creating a new model of general management. These investors include LBO partnerships such 
as Kohlberg Kravis Roberts and Clayton & Dubilier”. Jensen views that LBO firms’ 
organisational structure represents a long-term superior governance structure, where efficient 
monitoring and managerial discipline are applied through a combination of ownership 
concentration and considerable leverage. Cuny & Talmor (2007) add to Jensen’s view 
suggesting that in corporate turnarounds, private equity can emerge as an optimal solution, even 
when current ownership could conceivably implement the same operational changes as private 
equity. They argue that if a corporate turnaround strategy is implemented by the current 
management, the possibility of replacing an incompetent management is forgone. Also, if a 
turnaround strategy is led by the board, the incompetence of the current management may be 
                                                 
6 Clayton, Dubilier & Rice, The Carlyle Group and Merrill Lynch Global Private Equity acquired Hertz from Ford 
in 2005 through a leveraged buyout. By streamlining how the Hertz cleaned and refueled vehicles, they doubled 
the number of cars that could be processed every hour and re-rented. Hertz was able to do so without huge 
reductions in the work force: it cut less than 5 percent of 32,000 jobs.(Sorkin, 2007)  
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acknowledged, but the turnaround may fail due to personal frictions between the management 
and board.  
Critics of private equity argue that private equity investors’ compensation structures encourage 
a short-term profit-seeking agenda that is destructive to the economy. Former prime minister of 
Denmark, Poul Nyrup Rasmussen (2008) claims: “The big private equity funds have proven to 
be a menace to healthy companies, to workers’ rights, and to the European Union’s Lisbon 
Agenda […] These LBOs leave the company saddled with debt and interest payments, its 
workers are laid off, and its assets are sold. A once profitable and healthy company is milked 
for short-term profits, benefiting neither workers nor the real economy”. In general, concerns 
raised in political debates are often concentrated around the implications about stability of the 
financial system when large LBO credits fail. Moreover, among the academics, Rappaport 
(1989) acknowledges many of Jensen’s criticism of public firms’ inefficient practices, but 
argues that the LBO structure is not the optimal replacement. He views LBOs as a short-term 
“shock therapy”, where inefficient and badly-performing firms with sub-standard corporate 
governance structures are entered into an intense period of corporate and governance 
restructuring. These firms, he argues, are then returned to public ownership after a few years. 
Moreover, Shleifer & Summers (1988) suggest that buyouts transfer wealth to investors through 
lay-offs and wage reductions. Tykvová & Borell (2012) suggest that private equity investors 
may also transfer value from the financial system, as increases in bankruptcy rates may 
negatively affect financial institutions’ willingness and ability to provide transaction financing.  
As the private equity industry has matured from the 1980’s, the primary motivations have 
shifted from merely solving governance problems in public companies. Strӧmberg (2008) 
claims that in order to assess the economic role of private equity it is important to understand 
how long firms stay under LBO ownership. Kaplan (1991) studied LBOs in the 1980s and found 
that LBOs are “neither short-lived nor permanent”, having a median time of 6.8 years under 
private equity ownership. Supporting the argument of LBOs long-term organisational form, 
Strӧmberg (2008) finds that almost 40% of all LBOs remain in the LBO organisational form 
10 years after the original leveraged buyout was announced. Furthermore, only 42% of the 
private equity funds’ investments are exited within 5 years of the initial transaction. 
In addition, Kaplan & Strӧmberg (2008) argue that private equity backed firms are in fact better 
to withstand economic downturns, due to the private equity firms’ focus on firms in stable 
sectors with strong cash flow and potential for performance and productivity improvements. 
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Furthermore, Wilson et al. (2012) claim that private equity investors’ close monitoring and 
timely intervention in the event of financial problems implies better performance maintenance 
of the portfolio companies compared to similar non-buyout companies. 
Strӧmberg (2008) finds that the growth of private equity has not been at the expense of public 
stock markets. Over the 1970-2002 period, the fraction of going-private LBO transactions 
amounted to 6%, compared to the greater 11% fraction of going-public firms. Thus, the flow 
from private-to-public equity markets is net positive over the long run. He suggests that private 
equity in fact promotes stock markets, in countries with developed financial markets, since 
LBOs in these countries are particularly likely to exit through an IPO. These findings would 
imply that the LBO organisational form is becoming more permanent. 
Finally, LBOs are criticised to benefit private equity investors at the expense of employees and 
society (Union, 2007). From the private equity practitioner’s point of view, reductions in the 
number of employees and wage levels would undeniably be rational with aims of improving 
productivity. However, the critics argue that firm-level gains are offset by overall economic 
losses through job destruction. However, Kaplan (1989b), Lichtenberg & Siegel (1990) and 
Davis et al. (2011) find evidence that instead of concerns of job destruction, employment grows 
in LBO firms, but at a slower rate compared to similar “normal” firms. In more detail, in the 
U.S., existing jobs are cut primarily in the service sector rather than in manufacturing. Outside 
of the U.S. Amess et al. (2008) finds that private equity backed LBOs in the U.K. had no 
significant impact on wages or employment while non-private equity backed LBOs have the 
largest negative impact on employment. Furthermore, Jääskeläinen (2011) studies Nordic 
private equity backed buyouts and finds no significant differences in wage or employment 
development after the buyout. These findings suggest that, despite certain sporadic examples, 
private equity portfolio companies in general create value through improved productivity. 
The discussion is ongoing and, so far, it appears that the supporters of private equity have had 
the upper edge. However, as noted earlier, private equity funds are today sitting on record 
amounts of uninvested capital and the competition is increasing. This has resulted in a situation 
where attractive investment opportunities are more competed and have higher price tags. This 
is also likely to result in more investments made in less attractive opportunities that have higher 
likelihoods of failing. The discussion about LBO bankruptcies has already activated and been 
fuelled by e.g. the bankruptcy of TXU, the largest buyout ever conducted (see introduction). 
Judging from this, one could easily draw a conclusion that the LBO market has, in economics 
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terms, eventually turned into an efficient market and that the historical abnormally high returns 
could soon be replaced with abnormally high bankruptcy rates. However, in order to make any 
justified conclusions it is essential to understand which factors actually drive LBO 
bankruptcies. In section 3.3 I return to this topic and discuss the findings from existing 
literature.  
3.2.Value creation in leveraged buyouts 
The academic literature is not unanimous about private equity model’s sources of value 
creation. The arguments vary whether LBO returns derive from value creation or value transfer.  
Among academics, most agree that private equity investors create value by improving 
productivity and profitability of their portfolio companies. This is achieved through reducing 
agency costs with the use of debt bonding, aligning management incentives with equity 
ownership and active monitoring of the portfolio company (e.g. Davis et al., 2011; Harris et al., 
2005; Jensen, 1989; Kaplan, 1989a; Lichtenberg & Siegel, 1990). In contrast, value creation is 
also argued to derive from wealth transfers from the target company’s employees and/or 
previous owners to the LBO investors (Kaplan, 1989a; Wright et al., 2009). 
Kaplan & Strӧmberg (2008) describe that while in the late 1980s financial and governance 
engineering were common methods of value creation in LBOs, today’s most large private 
equity firms have added another type called operational engineering where industry and 
operating expertise is applied to add value to investments. Next, I discuss these issues in more 
detail by dividing the source of value creation into operational engineering, financial 
engineering and governance engineering. 
3.2.1. Operational engineering 
As leveraged buyouts emerged as an important phenomenon in the 1980s, Jensen (1989) 
predicted that the leveraged buyout organizations would eventually become the dominant 
corporate organizational form. The private equity firm would align management’s incentives 
with performance-based compensation, apply highly leveraged capital structures, and introduce 
active governance in its portfolio companies. Today majority of prominent private equity firms’ 
funds are organised around industries. A typical operational engineering value creation pan 
comprises of cost reductions, productivity improvements, revisions to strategy, add-on 
acquisitions, and management changes (Kaplan & Strӧmberg, 2008).  
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In addition to hiring merely dealmakers with a suitable skillset for financial engineering, the 
firms now hire also professionals with operating and industrial backgrounds. The private equity 
firms apply their industry and operating knowledge to identify attractive investments, and 
subsequently develop and implement value creation plans for these investments (Kaplan & 
Strӧmberg, 2008). Acharya et al. (2008) find that in organic deals which focus exclusively on 
internal value creation programs, GPs with an operational background outperform general 
partners with background in finance. 
Wright et al. (1998) report on a U.K. data that productivity improves significantly over the years 
3-5 after the buyout, compared to non-buyout firms (measured as the Return on Total assets 
and Profit to Employee). Focusing on U.K. manufacturing firms Amess (2003) show that LBO-
firms have superior operational performance up to four years after the transaction and two years 
prior the transaction. One explanation for the prior transaction performance is that vendors 
might prepare the sale of the company or that transaction is preliminary agreed with 
unannounced transaction agreements. Wilson et al. (2012) find that during the global recession, 
private equity backed buyouts experienced higher growth, productivity, profitability and 
improved working capital management compared to non-buyout firms. 
However, the source of the improvements in productivity remains a controversial issue. 
Lichtenberg & Siegel (1990) argue that resources previously used to produce long-term 
intangible investments are shifted to produce current output. This would result in a short-term 
improvement in efficiency at the expense of subsequent decline in performance due to low 
investments in intangible capital. Also, benefits of debt-bonding decrease over time. As 
leverage decreases, the constraints caused by debt covenants and potentially inflexible 
organisational structure might outweigh the benefits of incentive alignment.  
3.2.2. Financial engineering  
Private equity firms use leverage to construct optimal capital structures for their portfolio 
companies. Based on modelled financial estimates, debt structures are built from a variety of 
options (see section 2.2.5), often so that the company pays little or no taxes. The most common 
rationale for optimal capital structure originates to the trade-off theory (Myers, 1984). The 
theory explains that the optimal capital structure is achieved when the tax and debt bonding 
benefits offset, at the margin, the costs of financial distress. An expansion to the trade-off theory 
is the pecking order theory, which explains that firms prefer internal to external funds due to 
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information asymmetries, and thus result in companies to stray away from their optimal capital 
structures (Myers, 1984). 
The trade-off and the pecking order theories suggest that the capital structure of the firm should 
be tailored according to the characteristics of its assets. For example, a profitable firm with 
strong cash flows should use more leverage since it can effectively utilise tax shields and have 
lower probability of financial distress. Moreover, a firm with more investment possibilities and 
more intangible assets is more likely to have higher costs of distress. Respectively, the pecking 
order theory implies that a historically more profitable firm will end up with less leverage 
because it has been able to finance its investments with internal cash flow. However, the 
pecking order theory is less likely to explain capital structures in LBOs since the leverage is 
calculated at the time of the transaction and there is no time to stray away from the optimal 
leverage. (Axelson et al., 2012) 
The efficient use of tax shields, i.e. interest tax deductions from the use of debt, forms a valuable 
component in LBOs. Kaplan (1989a) reports that tax shields can explain between 4 to 40% of 
a firm’s value in the 1980s. At the lower range of the estimates, debt is repaid in 8 years and 
personal taxes offset the benefit of corporate tax deductions. At the higher range, debt is 
assumed to be permanent and that personal taxes provide no offset. (Axelson et al., 2012) 
suggest that a reasonable value in the 1980s would be somewhere between 10-20%. However, 
with today’s declined tax rates and use of leverage, the range is likely to be lower.  
Baker & Wurgler (2002) argue that firms exploit the equity market timing and issue equity 
when the cost of equity is relatively high, and respectively repurchase shares when the cost of 
debt is relatively low. Similarly on debt markets, Axelson et al. (2012) report that buyout firms 
are aware of the market timing benefits when the debt market is overheated. When the market 
imperfections exist and debt investors are buying debt at overvalued prices, buyout managers 
issue more debt. Hence, the authors argue that prevailing credit conditions are a robust indicator 
of LBO leverage. The higher the credit risk premium, measured as high yield spread over 
LIBOR, the lower the buyout leverage. Consequently, the LBO leverage is by nature pro-
cyclical, where the leverage peaks during hot credit markets (such as 2006-2007) and decreases 
during deteriorated credit conditions (such as 2008-2009). Interestingly, the authors find that 
for a matched set of public firms, leverage is countercyclical. This finding is against the trade-
off theory. If the theory held, we should expect the public firms’ leverage to also act pro-
cyclically. 
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Demiroglu & James (2010) report that reputable private equity firms can create value by taking 
advantage of market timing in credit markets and having lower agency costs of LBO debt. 
Reputable private equity firms pay narrower bank and institutional loan spreads, having longer 
loan maturities and relying more on institutional loans. The private equity firm reputation is 
also associated with higher buyout leverage. However, Axelson et al. (2012) argue that while 
lax credit conditions improve ability to increase leverage, it makes them prone to overpay for 
deals which results to lower returns from investments. 
Axelson et al. (2012) argue that if the funds are able to arbitrage debt and equity markets, 
leverage should have a positive impact on fund returns when debt market conditions provide 
cheap debt. However, the authors find that leverage in fact has a negative impact on returns for 
two possible reasons. Firstly, the cheap credit might lead to more intense bidding competition 
in the LBO market, which adversely affects returns. Secondly, the causality between fund 
returns and leverage might be the opposite. A fund that is expecting low returns might have an 
incentive to apply an overly leveraged and risky capital structure to gamble resurgence. Kaplan 
& Stein (1993) and Axelson et al. (2012) find that hot credit markets encourage excessive 
leverage which in turn might lead to higher subsequent default rates. 
Finally, Kaplan & Schoar (2005) find that the median returns of U.S. private equity funds from 
1985 to 2001 were 5-10% below the S&P 500. However, for the same period, the largest private 
equity funds outperformed the S&P 500 by 60-80% after the fees charged by the GP. The main 
source of success for this has been the ability to utilise aggressive leverage and to exit the 
investments at higher multiples than comparable firms. Acharya et al. (2009) study the 
outperformance of the most successful private equity firms and conclude that financial 
engineering and tactics do not tell the whole story. Their findings suggest that less than 30% of 
the outperformance derives from financial leverage and market timing. Thus, at least 70% 
represents actual outperformance. The residual outperformance can be attributed to the ability 
of the portfolio firm to produce more EBITDA growth compared to public peers; and the ability 
to exit at multiples above sector average.  
3.2.3. Governance engineering 
The inherent structure of publicly-held companies has received a fair amount of criticism 
among academics. Jensen (1989) claims that the public company structure impairs the value 
maximisation through legal and regulatory restrictions which lead to inefficient corporate 
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governance and misaligned interests between managers and owners. These corporate agency 
problems entail an opportunity for LBOs and MBOs to exploit the, so called, governance 
arbitrage (Cuny & Talmor, 2007). The evidence on the effectiveness of management buyouts 
implies intrinsic value in ownership change as the company performance improves significantly 
after the buyout (Lichtenberg & Siegel, 1990; and Wright et al., 1998). 
There are generally four ways how private equity firms can benefit by fixing the governance 
arbitrage. These are alignment of management incentives, debt-bonding and board control.  
Firstly, in order to align the management incentives in their portfolio companies, private equity 
firms typically give the management a large equity upside through stock and options. Kaplan 
(1989b) finds that the management equity ownership in the company increases significantly 
after the buyout. Before the buyout, the management team owns a median of 5.88% of the pre-
buyout equity, whereas the post-buyout management owns a median of 22.63% of post-buyout 
equity. By requiring the management to invest a considerable stake of their personal wealth into 
the company in the form of equity, the private equity firms ensure that the management not 
only has a significant upside, but a downside as well. Also, due to the private nature of the 
company, the management’s ownership is illiquid and cannot be easily sold or options exercised 
before the exit. Thus, the incentive for short-term performance manipulation decreases. (Kaplan 
& Strӧmberg, 2008) 
Secondly, the use of post-buyout leverage pressures the management to service debt and not to 
waste money on negative NPV investments. Leverage reduces the “free cash flow problem” 
described by Jensen (1986), where the management of the cash flow strong company with weak 
corporate governance might invest the money below cost of capital or waste it on organisational 
inefficiencies. On the other hand, excessive leverage might create inflexibility due to obligatory 
debt service.  
Thirdly, private equity investors control the boards of their portfolio companies by taking a seat 
on the board of directors and placing contractual restrictions on the management’s actions. 
Kaplan & Strӧmberg (2008) suggest that incompetent incumbent management might be willing 
to prefer some private equity buyouts in order to protect their jobs. However, Acharya et al. 
(2009) report that private equity backed companies have smaller boards which meet more often, 
compared to their public peers. Furthermore, the authors find while these boards vigorously 
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recruit and support top executives, the underperforming managers are also quickly replaced. 
39% of CEOs and 33% of CFOs are replaced in the first 100 days.  
Finally, if the portfolio company faces problems servicing its debt, the private equity firms may 
carry out well-timed strategic restructuring efforts, which can reduce the likelihood of default 
Pawlina (2010). Moreover, Wilson et al. (2012) suggest that GPs’ expertise in monitoring may 
improve portfolio firms’ performance through implementing cost efficiency and growth 
opportunities. In the absence of effective monitoring, the management could proactively 
undertake high risk projects. Moreover, the incumbent management may possess superior 
information to outsiders while their objectives, motives and competencies are not aligned 
properly to maximise the value of this information. Phalippou (2009) argues that while the 
private equity governance model may alleviate some agency problems, it can also introduce 
new ones, particularly between GPs and LPs. He claims that GPs’ fee structures encourage to 
time cash flows early, short investment horizons and target choosing (by leverage, size and 
capital structure changes) in order to maximise the transaction fees. 
3.3.Financial distress and bankruptcy 
Like previously discussed, private equity firms rely on highly leveraged capital structures 
dependent on the prevailing credit conditions, might be prone to overbid due to increasing 
competition between LBO firms, and under pressure to provide superior returns might 
undertake overly risky investments at the expense of LPs. Considering these factors, it would 
not be trivial to expect that a significant portion of these transactions would also encounter 
financial distress, default their debt payments, and eventually file for bankruptcy. In the next 
sections I will discuss financial distress in LBOs in more detail. 
3.3.1. Research on distressed LBOs 
Following the first buyout boom in the 1980s many most extremely leveraged buyouts ended 
up in bankruptcy (Andrade & Kaplan, 1998). Kaplan & Stein (1993) find that for MBOs 
performed between 1985 and 1989 approximately 30% defaulted compared to a 2% percent 
default rate for the five-year period before that.  
Axelson et al. (2009) compare the leverage of LBO companies with similar publicly traded peer 
companies. The authors report average Net debt to Enterprise value of 67% (14%), and Net 
debt to EBITDA of 5.4x (1.1x) figures for LBO firms (public peer companies). Kaplan & 
  34 
Strӧmberg (2008) find that when debt is cheaper relative to equity private equity firms aim to 
increase their returns by applying higher leverage. Thus, it is justified to expect significantly 
higher bankruptcy likelihood for LBO firms compared to public peer companies. 
For LBO transactions during 1970-2007, Strӧmberg (2008) derives an annual default rate of 
1.2% per year, assuming a six year average holding period. This is twice as high compared 
annual default rates of 0.6% for U.S. publicly traded firms over 1983 to 2002 (Ben-Ameur et 
al., 2008). Of all the firms undergoing a leveraged buyout, 6% eventually file for bankruptcy 
(Strӧmberg, 2008). Considering the amount of leverage used in LBOs the bankruptcy rate is 
rather low. Moreover, the annual LBO default rate is still lower than the annual default rate of 
1.6% for average corporate bond issuers 1980-2002 (Hamilton et al., 2006). The eventual 
bankruptcy rates in the U.S. (9%) and the U.K. (8%) LBOs are considerably higher than in 
continental Europe and Scandinavia (2%). Strömberg suggests that the large difference is due 
to more aggressive use of leverage in more developed private equity countries. 
Strӧmberg (2008) also finds that while private equity sponsored LBOs are more likely to 
achieve a successful exit, they are also somewhat more likely to face financial distress, 
controlling for other factors. There appears to be no significant relation between deal size and 
bankruptcy. Deals that were originally distressed are the most risky form of LBOs, being 5 
percentage points more likely to subsequently end up in distress again. Also, deals conducted 
by publicly traded funds exhibit a higher incidence of bankruptcy and restructuring compared 
to private partnerships. Finally, contrast to general perception of higher bankruptcy rates 
occurring during economic downturns, Strömberg surprisingly finds no major difference in 
bankruptcy probability across time periods.  
Tykvová & Borell (2012) study the bankruptcy likelihood of LBO firms. They find that while 
the risk of financial distress increases immediately after the buyout, three years after the buyout 
the risk levels are lower compared to comparable non-buyout companies. The authors argue 
that this is due to private equity firms’ tendency to invest in companies which initially have 
lower bankruptcy likelihoods. Immediately after the transaction the financial distress risk of 
buyout companies increases. Yet, the risk level incrementally decreases and goes below the 
non-buyout peer company level already three years after the transaction. 
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3.3.2. Financial distress vs. economic distress 
In order to examine the key sources of distress for buyout companies, it is essential to 
differentiate financial distress from economic distress. Andrade & Kaplan (1998) study a 
sample 31 of highly leveraged transactions between 1980 and 1989 that became financially, but 
not economically distressed. Poor firm and industry performance represent a source of 
economic distress and reflect the state of the industry or economic climate. Thus, a portfolio 
company without high leverage and satisfactory economic performance would not necessary 
experience any sort of financial distress. Likewise, a highly leveraged company facing 
economic difficulties would consequently face both economic and financial distress. In order 
to assess the particular effects of private equity ownership, it is appropriate to eliminate the 
impact of economic distress and focus on the determinants of financial distress. 
Andrade & Kaplan (1998) find that high leverage is the primary cause of distress in LBOs while 
the poor firm and industry performance while short-term interest changes play much smaller 
roles. The authors find that sample firms increase in value from pre-transaction to resolution of 
distress. Furthermore, the sample firms’ operating margins exceed the industry averages at the 
time of distress. These findings are inconsistent with the view that LBOs in the 1980s were 
unsuccessful. They find that the operating and net cash flow margins increase immediately after 
the buyout, but decrease 10 to 15% at the time of distress. However, the evidence shows that 
the margins rebound to pre-distress levels once the distress has been resolved. Moreover, the 
authors estimate the costs of financial distress as 10 to 20% of firm value, calculated using debt 
and equity market values.  
3.3.3. Leverage and availability of credit 
Axelson et al. (2012) find that the buyout leverage increases when debt market conditions are 
favourable. When cheap debt financing is available, buyout firms are encouraged to increase 
leverage in order to reach higher returns (Kaplan & Strӧmberg, 2008). Axelson et al. (2009) 
argue that during recession the amount of valuable investment opportunities decreases and 
those that exists have difficulty of being financed. Likewise, during boom times, the amount of 
valuable projects is higher but also bad deals will be financed in addition to the good ones.   
The power of creditor rights might also impact the bankruptcy rates. Lenders pay much 
attention to recovery rates in the event of a default. Recovery rates refer to the ability to 
repossess collateral and to reorganize debtors, and it depends largely on legal rights that 
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creditors have in reorganization and liquidation procedures. Bankruptcy laws define how the 
insolvency process is controlled and the priorities and rights to the bankrupted firm’s assets. 
Banks are expected to charge higher interest rate spreads for firms operating in countries with 
weak creditor rights and poor enforcement. However, as the riskiness of the company increases, 
banks limit their lending amounts and shorten loan maturities instead of increasing interest 
margins. The shorter maturity of debt allows the lender to review the borrower more frequently 
and restrict it from engaging in overly risky investments. (Bae & Goyal, 2009) 
Bae & Goyal (2009) find that better enforceability of contracts significantly increases the loan 
size, lengthens the loan maturity and reduces loan spreads. Moreover, the nature of a country’s 
creditor rights and property rights affect the loan spreads, maturity and size. Loan spreads are 
lower in countries with strong property rights protection and loan maturities are shorter in 
countries with weak property rights. Also, loan size increases in countries where property rights 
are stronger and firms that operate in countries with weak creditor rights borrow less externally. 
The property and creditor rights impact the ability and terms of the LBO borrowing. LBOs 
conducted in countries with lower property and creditor rights might have to settle for worse 
borrowing terms which would result in more strict covenants and higher interest payments. This 
could consequently increase the likelihood of financial distress.  
Moreover, Axelson et al. (2012) argue that due to the limited liability of GPs and their option-
like contract on carried interest, GPs are prone to overinvestment and might gamble by making 
large and highly levered investments in portfolio firms. Furthermore, when credit markets 
provide low interest rates, GPs can take on more leverage and invest more aggressively. This 
would increase the value of their option and incentivise to overpay for deals in excess of their 
expected fundamental value. The possible agency problems between GPs and LPs might predict 
that buyout leverage is more driven by the debt market conditions than the potential of the target 
firm. Thus, the availability of cheap debt financing may come with higher bankruptcy risks 
compared to similar non-buyout companies. 
3.3.4. Target company characteristics 
Bae & Goyal (2009) list the borrower risk characteristics which affect the lenders’ lending 
decisions and the structure of lending contracts. Similarly, they reflect the overall riskiness of 
the company and through the cost of lending might have a great impact on the overall 
performance of the LBO. Differences in, (a) firm size, (b) profitability, (c) leverage, (d) 
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collateral value of assets, and (e) growth opportunities, can significantly impact the cost of 
lending.  
a) Firm size: Larger firms are generally more diversified, mature, better recognized in the 
debt markets and have a lower risk of default due to fewer contracting problems. (Log 
total assets) 
b) Profitability: Profitable firms have better ability to service debt and are less likely to 
entail moral hazard problems where the company could expropriate assets and engage 
in overly risky investments. (EBIT to Total assets) 
c) Leverage: Levered firms have greater agency costs since they have greater incentives to 
increase the riskiness of assets at the expense of lenders. However, the acquired 
reputation in the debt markets can also reduce contracting problems. (Total debt to Book 
assets) 
d) Tangibility: Firms with more tangible assets, which can be collateralized, are likely to 
suffer smaller loss of value in the event of distress. Hence, tangibility reduces the costs 
of financial distress and makes it difficult to substitute high risk assets for low risk 
assets. (Fixed assets to Total assets) 
Furthermore, Opler & Titman (1993) identify factors that affect the costs of financial distress 
and act as proxies for the uniqueness and durability of a firm’s products, the collateral quality 
and the extent of its growth opportunities. The authors argue that cost of financial distress is 
likely to be highest among firms with relatively unique products that may require future service. 
Also, to the extent that debt can be collateralised, creditors are less vulnerable to expropriation. 
However, growth companies possess growth options and are not able to provide collateral for 
their debt, thus increasing the risk of expropriation for creditors and decreasing value of growth 
options for the company. The authors use proxies for these factors: uniqueness measured as 
R&D costs divided by Sales and expected growth measured as Tobin’s q or EBITDA to Market 
value of assets. 
Finally, Alperovych et al. (2013) study the effects of target company vendor source to post-
LBO efficiency. The authors find that different pre-buyout ownership structures entail different 
degrees of agency costs which affect the post-LBO efficiency. Divisional buyouts have the 
highest potential for efficiency improvement while SBOs present only limited efficiency 
improvements. Regardless of the vendor source, the LBO efficiency improvements have an 
apparent inflection point around the second year post-transaction.  
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3.3.5. Club deals as a form of risk sharing 
Filatotchev et al. (2006) argue that buyout investors undertake club deals as a means of risk 
sharing and portfolio diversification and are thus willing to invest in more risky companies and 
strategies compared to stand-alone investors. The riskiness of investments could thus entail a 
potentially higher risk of financial distress for syndicates. However, Tykvová & Borell (2012) 
finds that syndicates are better to handle financially distressed companies than stand-alone 
investors. 
Academics accredit club deals’ ability to manage particularly risky investments to several 
factors. Firstly, due to wider experience and access to different sources of information, 
syndication can provide more effective opinion sharing and target selection which may limit 
the risk of the company facing financial distress (Filatotchev et al., 2006). Secondly, as the 
syndicate has a combined set of complementary skills, it may be able to provide more intense 
monitoring and higher-quality support during the investment phase, which again would reduce 
the risk of financial distress (Casamatta & Haritchabalet, 2007). Thirdly, the existence of 
multiple partners in the syndicate, unlike in the case of a stand-alone investor, implies a 
potentially larger pool of financial resources which can turn out to be useful capital if the 
company faces financial difficulties (Brander et al., 2002). 
However, club deals might also entail agency problems, which emerge from potential 
information asymmetries among partners (Tykvová & Borell, 2012). For example, if the leading 
investor has more information about the quality of the deal, it might lead to an adverse selection 
problem where the less informed partner is invited to join only to low-quality deals. Also, club 
deals may result in moral hazard and free riding problems if the partners do not mutually 
participate in the monitoring and support of the portfolio company. In the event of distress, 
these problems will only exacerbate. Moreover, Ivashina & Kovner (2011) argue that if a 
transaction fails, club deals reduce the reputational risks. The willingness of partners to invest 
further capital to a distressed company may be lower when more than one investor shares the 
reputational loss.  
3.3.6. GP experience and reputation in risk taking 
Kaplan & Schoar (2005) find that established private equity funds are less sensitive to industry 
cycles and perform on average better compared to less experienced private equity investors. 
Jelic et al. (2005) report that MBOs backed by highly reputable buyout companies perform 
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significantly better compared to less reputable buyout companies. Furthermore, Alperovych et 
al. (2013) find that private equity firm’s experience positively and significantly correlates with 
post-transaction efficiency levels. These findings suggest that buyouts performed by more 
experienced GPs would be less likely to end up in bankruptcy. 
The benefits of experience and reputation can be attributed to gained industry know-how and 
improved banking relationships (Kaplan & Strӧmberg, 2008). Demiroglu & James (2010) find 
that numerous interactions between lenders and LBO firms reduce information asymmetry 
between the borrowing and lending parties. As a consequence reputable GPs pay lower bank 
and institutional loan spreads, are provided with longer loan maturities, and rely more on 
institutional leverage. Moreover, the authors find that these factors are associated with higher 
buyout leverage. Ivashina & Kovner (2011) argue that a contributing factor for banks offering 
better terms is their incentive to sell other fee-based services to LBO financing.   
In addition, Tykvová & Borell (2012) suggest that inexperienced private equity investors might 
be prone to “show up” by investing in riskier companies and strategies while experienced 
investors have better know-how and instruments to avoid bankruptcy. However, experienced 
investors may be better at transferring value through e.g. dividend recaps, which could increase 
the risk of financial distress in portfolio companies. The authors find that distress risk levels are 
higher for experienced investors than for inexperienced investors. 
3.4.Bankruptcy laws 
In this section, I introduce creditor protection and bankruptcy laws, which greatly affect the 
overall effectiveness of the financial markets and firms’ capital structures. The nature of 
bankruptcy laws varies greatly by country and reflects in the likelihood of whether a company 
is restructured or liquidated. Bankruptcy laws matter to a great degree to private equity firms 
which are particularly concerned with protecting their reputation and assets of their portfolio 
companies. Hence, private equity investors often negotiate restructurings for distressed 
portfolio companies and refinance in order to decrease the likelihood of having the company 
entered into formal insolvency (Acharya et al., 2009). 
3.4.1. Foundation of creditor rights 
In order for the economy to function properly, firms need external debt financing for their 
investments. At the same time, creditors face risks that the capital they have lent may not be 
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returned. Controlling shareholders or managers may spend the capital on excessive perk 
consumption, invest in high risk investments not agreed upon and/or default on debt contracts. 
The potential for insider expropriation severely undermines the effectiveness of the financial 
system. The most effective way to limit expropriation is through the legal system, which enables 
creditors to finance firms to a significant extent since their rights are protected by the law. In 
the event of a default, the right to repossess and liquidate the collateral forms the most basic 
right of a senior collateralised creditor.  However, the effectiveness of the enforcement these 
rights depends largely on legal rules. Some countries’ laws prevent creditors from repossessing 
their claims because it leads to liquidation of firms, which is considered to be socially 
undesirable. In turn, these countries may allow creditors to vote in the decision of how to 
reorganise the company. (Claessens et al., 2001) 
Creditors are more willing to finance firms when reorganisation and creditors’ rights are 
extensive and well-enforced by regulators or courts. The effective bankruptcy procedures are 
essential to allow creditors to exercise their rights appropriately. Furthermore, in the event of a 
corporate debt crisis, the inability to repossess collateral could trigger a cascade effect of debtor 
defaults and magnifying the consequences for the whole economy. (Claessens et al., 2001) 
3.4.2. The economic impact of differences in bankruptcy laws  
Porta et al. (2007) report that the in the late 1990s, legal rules governing investor protection 
differed greatly among countries. For example, in some countries (e.g. United States and 
Finland) reorganisation procedure imposes an automatic stay on the assets, which prevents 
secured creditors from taking possession of loan collateral. The rule protects managers and 
unsecured creditors against secured creditors and prevents automatic liquidation. A decade 
later, the authors report that differences still exist, but there are signs of convergence due to 
globalisation.  
Acharya et al. (2011) report that there still exists a central challenge in today’s financial 
economics to integrate finance theory with legal frameworks to facilitate cross-country 
comparisons of financial data. Despite the slight convergence brought by the globalisation, 
there is a large degree of divergence in the rights accorded to claimholders in the event of 
default on debt contracts. For example in the U.K, a secured creditor can often liquidate the 
company and realise the collateral without considering the interests of other claimants and 
without the risk of being challenged in bankruptcy court (Davydenko & Franks, 2008). 
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Meanwhile other countries afford equity-holders with substantial rights, such as allowing 
management to seek protection from creditors unilaterally by filing for reorganisation, without 
creditor consent (Claessens et al., 2001). In the United States, this sort of protection is referred 
to as Chapter 11 and it gives management significant power, since creditors have to wait to get 
their money or collateral. 
The other bankruptcy procedure in the United States is Chapter 7, which instead of 
reorganisation, results in liquidation where the company stops all operations and goes 
completely out of business. If the company fails in its Chapter 11 reorganisation efforts, the 
bankruptcy filing shifts to Chapter 7, resulting in liquidation. In liquidation the debtors can 
choose whether to liquidate the debtor’s assets through a cash auction or structured bargaining. 
Managers often prefer Chapter 7 over Chapter 11, since they can retain their jobs at least for 
the initial stages of reorganisation. Managers also may file for bankruptcy early, which 
preserves distressed firms’ value as a going concern. (Claessens et al., 2001) 
Finally, Bris et al. (2006) compare the bankruptcy costs between Chapter 7 liquidation and 
Chapter 11 reorganisation in large U.S. corporate bankruptcies from 1995 to 2001. The authors 
find that in terms of direct expenses, Chapter 7 liquidations are not faster or cheaper than 
Chapter 11 reorganisations. Moreover, Chapter 11 is more able to preserve asset values and 
thereby allows a higher recovery rate for creditors. Acharya et al. (2011) report that the 
differences in cross-country bankruptcy codes affect firms’ capital structure choices. The 
authors find that firms employ greater leverage under a bankruptcy code that favours equity-
holders (such as the U.S.). Respectively, less leverage is employed if the code favours debt-
holders (such as the U.K.).  
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4. Hypotheses 
Based on issues raised in existing literature, I form the theoretical framework for my hypotheses 
to explain the determinants of failed LBOs. This framework outlines the subsequent empirical 
analysis. The theoretical background concerning most hypotheses is covered in sections two 
and three, but is also briefly introduced along with the hypotheses. Overall, the focus of this 
study is to explain determinants of failed LBOs rather than successful ones. All non-bankrupt 
buyouts, regardless of their eventual return-on-investment (even if highly negative), are 
considered as non-failed. Also buyouts, where the general partner has prevented bankruptcy by 
injecting additional capital to the portfolio company, are not considered among failed 
transactions. 
I form hypotheses to approach the research questions from three angles. Firstly, I examine the 
effects of deal source and type on the bankruptcy probability and initial financial distress risk 
of the buyout. Secondly, I analyse how specific target firm characteristics, such as cyclicality, 
capital structure and operating metrics, are associated with the probability of bankruptcy. 
Thirdly, I assess the influence of exogenous factors, such as the economic climate, which are 
independent from target companies and general partners. Empirical tests in Chapter 6 are further 
divided into time-period wise subgroups in order to assess the significance of determinants 
across the changing dynamics of the private equity market.  
4.1.Buyout characteristics 
H1: Deal source and type greatly affect the subsequent probability of bankruptcy 
 Buyouts labelled as… …are associated with… 
…bankruptcy 
rates 
H1.1: bankruptcy sale higher 
H1.2: corporate divestiture lower 
H1.3: secondary LBO lower 
H1.4: privatisation of gov. entity  lower 
H1.5: cross border  lower 
H1.6: going private  higher 
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I expect that buyout vendor source significantly affects bankruptcy probability. Among 
previous literature, Alperovych et al. (2013) study the effects of vendor source on efficiency 
improvements in post-LBO companies and find the highest efficiency improvements in 
corporate divestitures. Accordingly, I expect that the efficiency improvement potential is also 
associated with lower bankruptcy probability. Strӧmberg (2008) analyses the exit routes of 
LBOs and finds that originally distressed companies are most likely to again go bankrupt. I 
form my expectation for buyouts originating from bankruptcy sales accordingly. 
In addition to testing the findings in previous literature, I form hypotheses for additional 
features. Firstly, I expect that SBOs are less likely to go bankrupt. While Alperovych et al. 
(2013) find that SBOs exhibit the lowest post-LBO efficiency improvements, previous private 
equity ownership might also act as certification of the quality of the target company. Hence, 
prior-private equity-owned firms should be less risky investments. Secondly, I expect prior-
government owned companies to be less prone to bankruptcy, since these companies tend to 
occur around infrastructure related low-risk businesses. Thirdly, I expect that cross-border 
buyouts are associated with lower bankruptcy rates. One might claim that these transactions 
entail additional challenges and risks for the private equity firm due to information asymmetry, 
culture and language barriers. However, for those very reasons private equity firms may in fact 
pose more strict screening criteria and invest only in the most promising opportunities. Also, in 
the 1980s and 1990s before private equity industry spread worldwide and U.S. or UK private 
equity firms began setting up international offices, cross-border transactions provided untapped 
investment opportunities without costly bidding wars Carey & Morris (2012).  
H2: Investors’ experience, share of knowledge and aligned interests are associated with lower 
bankruptcy rates 
 Buyouts conducted… …are associated with… 
…bankruptcy 
rates 
H2.1: by experienced investors  lower 
H2.2: with management’s equity 
participation 
lower 
H.2.3 as club deals lower 
Findings from previous literature suggest that general partners’ experience and reputation is 
reflected in improved post-buyout performance and exhibit lower bankruptcy likelihood 
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compared to less experienced and reputable investors (see e.g. Kaplan & Schoar, 2005; 
Tykvová & Borell, 2012; Alperovych et al., 2013). Accordingly, I form my hypothesis that 
buyouts conducted by investors with experience from more than five previous buyouts are 
associated with lower bankruptcy rates.  
In the case of management’s equity participation the previous literature is divided. Jensen 
(1989) appraises that LBOs superior organisational form which partly derives from the ability 
to align management’s incentives efficiently through equity participation. In the same tone, 
Kaplan & Strӧmberg (2008) argue that management’s equity ownership decreases 
management’s incentive for short-term performance manipulation. Wilson & Wright (2013) 
provides opposing evidence that MBOs and MBIs in the U.K. have significantly higher failure 
rates compared to private equity backed buyouts. However, the higher failure rate in MBOs and 
MBIs might also derive from the management’s biased view towards the company or 
incompetent managers’ effort to engage in an MBO in order to protect their jobs. Private equity 
firms often replace the incompetent management and hence managers that invest in LBOs could 
be in general more able to run the business successfully. Hence, I align my expectation 
according to Jensen (1989) and Kaplan & Strömberg (2008) that management participation is 
associated with lower bankruptcy rates. 
Finally, findings from Filatotchev et al. (2006), Tykvová & Borell (2012) and Casamatta & 
Haritchabalet (2007) suggest that club deals benefit from pooling of experience and are 
associated with improved ability to handle risky investments. Accordingly, I expect that 
buyouts including more than one private equity firm are associated with lower bankruptcy rates. 
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4.2.Target company characteristics 
H3: Buyouts of more cyclical and leveraged companies are associated with higher bankruptcy 
rates 
 Target company’s… …are associated with… 
…bankruptcy 
rates 
H3.1: high cyclicality higher 
H3.2: high leverage higher 
H3.3: low profitability higher 
H3.4: low tangibility higher 
H3.5: young age higher 
The founder of Blackstone, Stephen A. Schwarzman, attributed the determinants of 
Blackstone’s failed investments in the 1990s and 2000s as follows: “These were all medium-
sized, cyclical businesses that we bought within two or three years of an economic top. We paid 
too much for some of them. We had ambitious turnaround plans for them that turned out to be 
very difficult to execute.” In addition to being leveraged cyclical bets, the companies suffered 
from intractable issues in competitiveness and lack of understanding of the underlying business. 
(Carey & Morris, 2012) 
At best, a leveraged investment in a cyclical company at the bottom of the cycle coupled with 
an exit at the top might greatly magnify returns. However, if invested at a wrong time in the 
cycle, the consequences may prove to be very detrimental. As portfolio firms’ capital structures 
are often aggressively leveraged, materialisation of projected cash flows is critical for the 
success of the investment. If a portfolio company’s cash flows are highly dependent on the 
general economy, a negative turn in the cycle may be drive the company into bankruptcy.  
Hence, I expect that the cyclicality of the target company’s business is associated with higher 
bankruptcy rates. I assess the relationship by applying cyclicality measures based on target 
companies’ SIC-codes. The measures are adopted from Berman & Pfleeger (1997) and reflect 
the particular industry’s dependence on GDP.  
I also form hypotheses concerning leverage, profitability and tangibility. Bae & Goyal (2009) 
argue that leveraged firms have greater incentives to increase the riskiness of assets at the 
expense of lenders. Likewise, less profitable have worse ability to service debt and are more 
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likely to entail in moral hazard problems. Also, firms with less collateralisable tangible assets 
have higher costs of financial distress because they are more able to substitute high risk assets 
for low risk ones. I expect all of these to be associated with higher bankruptcy rates. 
Finally, mature firms often have more established business plans, client relationships and 
enable more accurate projections. Furthermore, Tykvová & Borell (2012) report that more 
mature companies exhibit lower bankruptcy likelihoods. Hence, I expect that younger firms are 
more likely to end up in bankruptcy. 
4.3.Economic climate 
H4: Buyouts performed during favourable macro-economic conditions are associated with 
higher bankruptcy rates  
 Buyouts conducted during… …are associated with 
…bankruptcy 
rates 
H4.1: favourable credit conditions higher 
H4.2: positive GDP growth higher 
Axelson et al. (2012) find that buyout leverage increases when debt market conditions are 
favourable. When cheap debt financing is available, buyout firms are encouraged to increase 
leverage in order to reach higher returns (Kaplan & Strӧmberg, 2008).  
I form my hypothesis accordingly. The favourability of credit markets is measured as the spread 
between BofAML high yield index and Libor, both for the U.S. and Europe. A high spread 
implies uncertainty among investors and reflect unfavourable credit conditions. Respectively, 
low spreads denote low risk requirements and more favourable credit conditions. Furthermore, 
buyouts conducted during periods of strong economic growth might be more exposed to 
overbidding and overly optimistic about financial plans. Hence, I expect that positive GDP 
growth is associated with higher bankruptcy rates. 
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5. Data  
In this section, I describe the data used in my thesis. In order to source determinants of failed 
LBOs according to my hypotheses, I collect data of two natures. Firstly, I analyse the exogenous 
factors, such as the economic climate, which are independent of both the target company and 
general partner. Secondly, I evaluate endogenous target company or deal specific features 
where the private equity firm has power to influence the structure and riskiness of the deal. Due 
to private nature of LBO companies, the availability of financial information is scarce. Thus, 
for the latter analysis, the sample size is considerably smaller. 
Next I discuss the retrieval process of the data and provide descriptive summary statistics of the 
sample. Transaction data and target company financials are retrieved from Capital IQ and 
supplemented with Bureau Van Dijk’s Orbis database and Mergermarket data (M&A 
intelligence media company). Control variables capturing the effects of the economic climate 
are retrieved from Datastream, OECD, World Bank and US Federal Reserve.  
5.1.Sample formation 
I retrieve the LBO transaction data using the Capital IQ database. Capital IQ covers over 
355,000 M&A transactions globally, 21,000 bankruptcies mainly in North America, financial 
information for over 2.2 million private companies and details for over 18,000 private equity 
firms. I include transactions labelled as private equity buyouts conducted during January 1982- 
December 2013. I limit the geographic reach to U.S., Canada and Europe on the basis of the 
target company’s headquarters. I exclude buyouts with transaction statuses labelled as 
cancelled, pending, failed or unknown. Also, in order to focus exclusively on leveraged 
buyouts, I include only transactions where a majority stake is acquired. Within these criteria 
Capital IQ database provides details for total 22,796 transactions with a total disclosed 
transaction value of $4 trillion. In terms of transaction count and value, LBOs conducted in 
Europe and North America comprise both virtually 50% of the sample. The sample is in line 
with Strӧmberg (2008) who, using the same Capital IQ data, reports approximately 21,000 
LBOs during 1970-2007 with a transaction value of $3.6 trillion. Figure 4 depicts the frequency 
of LBOs over time in my sample. 
  48 
Figure  4 – Sample LBOs over time  
The total transaction value of all sample LBOs amount to $4 trillion. Of the sample transactions, Capital 
IQ provides transaction values for 41% of transactions, and thus the real value is in reality far higher. 
The geographic region is determined by the location of target company’s headquarters.  
 
 
In order to analyse target company characteristics and measures of financial distress, I retrieve 
consolidated financial statement information for the target companies. Financials are from 
Capital IQ which covers financial data from 1994 onwards. Due to the private nature of target 
companies, the availability of financial data is rather scarce which limits the sample size on 
financials-dependent analyses. 
5.2.Bankruptcies of sample companies 
The process of determining the bankruptcy status is not quite straightforward. Capital IQ and 
Orbis provide information for the company’s current status; for example whether the company 
is still operating, in bankruptcy or under restructuring proceedings.  However, the reliability of 
the company current status code is questionable as the company may have exited its bankruptcy 
proceeding and continues its operations. The company status code considers a company being 
bankrupt only if its operations are dissolved permanently after bankruptcy proceeding. Thus, 
the company status code would exclude insolvency events for companies that have become 
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insolvent or applied for bankruptcy, but later successfully exited the process and continued their 
operations. If the company status code is simply applied, it would most likely distort the data. 
A case in point from the sample: Station Casinos LLC, a gaming company based in Lase Vegas, 
was acquired by Colony Capital LLC through a leveraged buyout in 2006. In July 2009, Station 
Casinos breached its loan covenants and filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy. However, in April 
2010, the company’s key lenders JPMorgan Chase and Deutsche Bank announced to take 
control of the company and the company subsequently exited bankruptcy as an operating 
company. For Station Casinos LLC, Orbis and Capital IQ label the company as “active” or 
“operating”. These company status codes would incorrectly imply that the Station Casinos did 
not face any materialised financial distress during Colony Capital’s ownership. Hence, I have 
applied multiple methods to correct these sort of errors. 
Among previous studies, Strӧmberg (2008), studying the exit routes and longevity of private 
equity ownership, identifies the same problem with company status codes using Capital IQ data. 
He aims to solve the problem by tracking the ultimate fate of the LBO firms through later M&A 
transactions and finally by conducting extensive web-searches on a firm-by-firm basis. In 
another study, Tykvová & Borell (2012) analyse bankruptcy likelihood of private equity backed 
firms. The authors use Orbis data and also determine the ultimate fate of the company through 
the company status code. The authors however do not disclose bankruptcy ratios in their sample 
and thus benchmarking the bankruptcy rates to their data is not possible. In a somewhat similar 
way to Strӧmberg (2008), I apply multiple additional methods to determine whether the 
company has become insolvent at some point of time during its operations: 
a) Capital IQ bankruptcy database: Capital IQ collects information on U.S. and Canadian 
bankruptcies and provides information on 520 bankruptcies in the sample. This amounts 
to bankruptcy percentage of 6.9% for North American companies. 
 
b) Transaction secondary feature: By retrieving a complete list of transactions labelled as 
“bankruptcy sale” from Capital IQ, I am able to identify bankruptcies for buyout 
companies that exited the bankruptcy proceeding under new ownership. Through this 
procedure I find 249 more bankruptcies. 
 
c) Mergermarket deal type: Similarly to the transaction secondary feature, I retrieve a list 
of 6,910 private equity related LBOs from Mergermarket database. Mergermarket, a 
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media company, specialises in corporate financial news and analysis, and provides 
detailed deal descriptions for transactions. I am able to match 1,820 transactions and 
find 4 more buyouts acquired from bankruptcy proceedings.  Bankruptcy years are 
manually collected from deal descriptions. 
 
d) Capital IQ company status: Bankrupt if labelled as “Out of business”, “Reorganising” 
or “Liquidating”. The year of bankruptcy is assumed to equal the last year of available 
financials. The criteria returns 287 bankruptcies in the sample. 
 
e) Orbis company status: By matching the companies through their legal entity identifier, 
when available, I consider companies as bankrupt if the historical status code includes 
label “Bankruptcy” or “Active(insolvency)”. Bankruptcy years for these companies are 
manually checked with internet searches. The criteria returns 9 more bankruptcies in the 
sample. 
As a result I am able to identify 1,069 bankruptcies within the sample that match the incumbent 
private equity owner. In the following I discuss the descriptive statistics of the sample.  
5.3.Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 describes an overview of sample LBOs and bankruptcies. Vast majority (71%) of LBOs 
occur in the most recent decade 2002-2013, which demonstrates the fast growing pace of the 
industry during the latest buyout boom period. Despite having being mostly an American 
phenomenon in the 1980s, the buyout activity in Europe and North America has evened out 
during the sample period 1982-2013. European LBOs constitute for 49.4% of the sample, while 
U.S. and Canadian LBOs account for the remaining 51.6%.  
The sample comprises of 1,069 LBOs that have either filed for bankruptcy or failed to make 
the required debt payments thus ending up in debt restructuring procedure. The bankruptcy rate 
for the whole sample during 1982-20013 amounts to 4.7%. However, considering that the 
average pre-bankruptcy holding period of 5 years in the sample, the bankruptcy rate of 6.1% 
during 1982-08 is a more realistic figure. This figure is in line with Strӧmberg (2008) and 
Wilson & Wright (2013) who find that 6% and 5.3% of LBO firms eventually enter financial 
restructuring or bankruptcy. Buyouts for North American target companies show higher 6.4% 
bankruptcy rates compared to European 5.7% during 1982-2008.  
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The most active LBO bankruptcy period (8.1% bankruptcy rate) was during the dot-com bubble 
in late 1990s which was characterised by inflated transaction prices and risky bets on uncertain 
business models. Somewhat surprisingly, buyouts performed during 2003-2008 exhibit only a 
relatively low 4.7% bankruptcy rate. One could expect that the ample availability of credit and 
swollen transaction multiples preceding the global financial crisis in 2007-2008 would had 
made LBOs particularly vulnerable. The low bankruptcy rate however supports the suggestion 
of Kaplan & Strӧmberg (2008) that default rates in the recent recession would probably be 
lower than those that were following previous boom periods. The authors suggest that buyouts 
conducted during mid-2000s generally had better interest coverage ratios and looser covenants. 
Moreover, Wilson et al. (2012) provide parallel evidence. The authors report that private equity 
backed buyouts in the U.K. during the global recession experienced higher growth, 
productivity, profitability, and improved working capital management, relative to comparable 
non-buyout sponsor-backed firms.  
Among different deal types (labelled as secondary transaction features by Capital IQ) there 
appears to be vast differences in bankruptcy rates. Target companies that have originally been 
distressed are most likely to subsequently end up in bankruptcy (23.8% bankruptcy rate). On 
the other hand, Cross-border (4.1%) and secondary LBOs (4.3%) appear to be the safest kind 
of regular buyouts. While the traditional opportunities for operational and governance 
improvements in secondary LBOs are generally lower, the low bankruptcy rate for those 
transactions might signal superior quality for prior private equity-backed companies as buyout 
targets. As a comparison, going private transactions, where the target company is public-listed, 
exhibit a far higher bankruptcy rate of 10.2%. This finding is contrary to the view of Jensen 
(1989) about the superiority of the LBO-model compared to public entity model.  
Buyouts conducted by experienced investors (history for least five prior deals) exhibit a 6.2% 
bankruptcy rate, which is in line with the sample average. Hence, it appears that experienced 
investors are not more able to handle risky investments and prevent eventual bankruptcy. On a 
same note, neither does it seem that inexperienced private equity firms would be particularly 
likely to engage in “all-in” strategies to build reputation. On the other hand it may be that 
experienced investors are better at handling risky investments, but the superior lender 
relationships facilitate higher use of leverage and increases the riskiness of investments. Hence, 
the use of more aggressive leverage may balance out the possible difference between 
experienced and inexperienced investors.  
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Table 3 depicts the distribution of industries for sample transactions. In order to control for 
industry-specific risks, I divide the buyouts into 47 different industry portfolios according to 
target companies’ 4-digit SIC industry codes. In the procedure, I apply the Fama/French 48 
industry portfolios7. Of all the industry portfolios, Business Services accounts form the majority 
(12%) of all transactions and exhibit a modest 3% bankruptcy rate during 1982-2013. The most 
bankruptcy-prone industries are Retail and Automobiles & Trucks with 12% bankruptcy rates. 
For a large number of transactions (31%), Capital IQ does not provide an assigned industry 
code. These transactions are included in the Unknown portfolio. However, the average 
bankruptcy rate in the unknown group is 4%, relatively close to sample average, and hence does 
not distort the rest of the sample greatly. 
Figure 5 depicts the relationship between cyclicality and bankruptcy rate of sample LBOs 
arranged according to the Fama/French 48 industry portfolios. Cyclicality measures are adopted 
from Berman & Pfleeger (1997) and matched for portfolio companies through their SIC-
industry codes. The cyclicality measure reflects the correlation of industry demand with GDP.  
A visual inspection reveals that the relationship is rather scattered, even though some sort of 
linearity seems to appear. Nevertheless, the figure does provide some support for the anecdotal 
evidence of Blackstone’s failed cyclical investments (see 4.2). The two industries that suffer 
from highest bankruptcy rates, Automobiles & Trucks and Retail, exhibit very high cyclicality 
measures. This implies that at least for these industries, some part of bankruptcy can be 
accredited to the cyclical nature of the business. However, market timing plays an essential role 
in the fate of cyclical investments. It makes a great difference whether cyclical businesses are 
acquired at the top of the cycle with inflated multiples or at the bottom at discount. If the price 
tag is high, more aggressive leverage may need to be used to reach satisfactory returns. A 
comparison to the time-period-wise bankruptcy rates in Table 2 reveals that there is in fact large 
variation in bankruptcy rates for the Automobiles & Trucks and Retail industries across time 
periods. Respectively, there is also variation in the general economic performance across time 
periods. Hence, in order to draw coherent conclusions from cyclicality, the measure needs to 
be analysed together with the state of the economy. 
                                                 
7 Available at http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/index.html 
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Table 4 illustrates financial statement information for buyout companies separated by the 
bankrupted and non-bankrupted buyouts. The median values indicate significant differences in 
most of the ratios. Mean values tell similar stories, but are not reported in the table for brevity.  
One year after the buyout, bankrupted buyouts have an average leverage of 5.5x (Net debt to 
EBITDA) compared to 3.5x for non-bankrupted buyouts. These buyouts also have higher 
leverage already before the buyout. Bankrupted buyouts have lower interest coverage of 1.0x 
compared to also relatively low 1.6x for non-bankrupted buyouts. Profitability however does 
not seem to be related to bankruptcy. Bankrupted buyouts even exhibit slightly higher EBITDA-
margins. Bankrupted buyouts are also characterised by higher capital expenditures which 
reflects in lower cash conversion ratio and larger amount of fixed assets. Bankruptcy likelihood 
score Altman Z indicates consistently larger distress for bankrupted companies even from one 
year before the buyout to two years after it.  
The scope of the financial statement analysis is limited to transactions taking place from 1994 
onwards due to availability of years for financial statement information in Capital IQ. Also due 
to private nature of buyout companies, the availability of financial statement information is 
significantly more scarce compared to public companies. The lack of available data imposes an 
issue of possible sample selection bias, which is a common problem also recognised in existing 
private equity literature (see e.g. Valkama et al., 2013; Strӧmberg, 2008). These studies 
overcome the issue by applying Heckman methodology, which I also use to control the possible 
sample selection bias.  
Finally, Table 5 reports bankruptcy filing statistics for sample buyouts when data is available. 
The data is based on Capital IQ bankruptcy database which considers U.S. bankruptcies. The 
table is compiled for descriptive purposes only and its information is not used in later analysis. 
In the sample, majority of bankrupted buyouts have entered into Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
protection. Here, companies try to reorganise their debt and re-emerge as a healthy organisation. 
In the other option, Chapter 7, bankrupted firms’ assets are liquidated in order to pay creditors. 
Only 12.5% of sample buyouts enter Chapter 7 proceeding. The duration of Chapter 11 is on 
average longer than Chapter 7. In majority of cases, the bankruptcy plan financing includes 
issuance of new equity and debt. As debtor-in-possession financing (DIP), the financing for a 
company under Chapter 11 is arranged most often in the form of revolving credit facility. This 
credit usually has priority over existing debt, equity and other claims. 
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Table 2 – Overview of the sample
The sample of 22,796 leveraged buyouts during 1982-2013 is obtained from Capital IQ database. 
Panel A describes the sample transactions with respect to time period, geographic region, deal 
characteristics and valuation multiples. Panel B similarly describes the distribution of bankruptcies. 
Panel C depicts corresponding bankruptcy rates. Experienced investor refers to transactions where 
the investor(s) have experience from at least five prior buyouts. Club deal indicates buyouts with more 
than one buyer. 
Panel A: Transactions and deal types
Period 1982-88 1989-95 1996-02 2003-09 2010-13 Total (#) % of total
Number of all transactions 597 1,623 5,142 9,693 5,741 22,796 100.0 %
Region
U.S. & Canada 435 939 2,582 4,692 2,892 11,540 50.6 %
Europe 162 684 2,560 5,001 2,849 11,256 49.4 %
Bankruptcy Sale 0.5 % 1.2 % 1.7 % 2.8 % 3.8 % 603 2.6 %
Club deal 19.4 % 29.9 % 29.9 % 28.7 % 27.1 % 6,480 28.4 %
Corporate divestiture 21.1 % 17.3 % 18.4 % 17.7 % 18.1 % 4,108 18.0 %
Cross-border 10.6 % 20.0 % 22.9 % 25.4 % 24.8 % 5,451 23.9 %
Experienced PE firm 53.1 % 66.9 % 71.6 % 74.3 % 78.9 % 16,815 73.8 %
Going private transaction 7.5 % 3.0 % 4.0 % 4.0 % 3.2 % 869 3.8 %
Management participated 41.5 % 40.7 % 43.0 % 35.6 % 25.7 % 8,036 35.3 %
Privatization of government entity 0.3 % 1.0 % 0.4 % 0.2 % 0.2 % 77 0.3 %
Secondary LBO 2.3 % 6.9 % 14.7 % 19.4 % 15.4 % 3,653 16.0 %
Valuation
EV/EBITDA (median) 10.2x 9.0x 8.0x 9.4x 9.0x 1,402 6.2 %
Panel B: Bankruptcies (by transaction years)
Period 1982-88 1989-95 1996-02 2003-09 2010-13 Total (#) % of total
Number of bankruptcies 39 128 415 451 36 1,069 100.0 %
Region
U.S. & Canada 25 83 227 219 18 572 53.5 %
Europe 14 45 188 232 18 497 46.5 %
Bankruptcy Sale 3 5 28 55 8 99 9.3 %
Club deal 9 46 114 128 5 302 28.3 %
Corporate divestiture 8 17 67 85 3 180 16.8 %
Cross-border 3 16 63 83 9 174 16.3 %
Experienced PE firm 18 88 308 342 27 783 73.2 %
Going private transaction 6 4 30 30 2 72 6.7 %
Management participated 15 49 149 147 7 367 34.3 %
Privatization of government entity 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0 %
Secondary LBO 1 7 43 69 5 125 11.7 %
Valuation
EV/EBITDA (median) 7.0x 7.2x 7.2x 8.0x 9.7x 97 11.7 %
Panel C: Bankruptcy rates (%)
Period 1982-88 1989-95 1996-02 2003-09 2010-13 1982-09 1982-13
Bankruptcy rate (%) 6.5 % 7.9 % 8.1 % 4.7 % 0.6 % 6.1 % 4.7 %
Region
U.S. & Canada 5.7 % 8.8 % 8.8 % 4.7 % 0.6 % 6.4 % 5.0 %
Europe 8.6 % 6.6 % 7.3 % 4.6 % 0.6 % 5.7 % 4.4 %
Deal type (bankruptcy rate %  within deal type)
Bankruptcy Sale 100.0 % 25.0 % 31.8 % 20.3 % 3.6 % 23.8 % 16.4 %
Club deal 7.8 % 9.5 % 7.4 % 4.6 % 0.3 % 6.0 % 4.7 %
Corporate divestiture 6.3 % 6.1 % 7.1 % 4.9 % 0.3 % 5.8 % 4.4 %
Cross-border 4.8 % 4.9 % 5.3 % 3.4 % 0.6 % 4.1 % 3.2 %
Experienced PE firm 5.7 % 8.1 % 8.4 % 4.7 % 0.6 % 6.2 % 4.7 %
Going private transaction 13.3 % 8.2 % 14.6 % 7.7 % 1.1 % 10.2 % 8.3 %
Management participated 6.0 % 7.4 % 6.7 % 4.3 % 0.5 % 5.5 % 4.6 %
Privatization of government entity 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 %
Secondary LBO 7.1 % 6.3 % 5.7 % 3.7 % 0.6 % 4.3 % 3.4 %
Deal type (# of bankruptcies / %  of all transactions)
Deal type (%  of all transactions)
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Table 3 – Sample LBOs and bankruptcies by industry 
 
 
In order to determine the riskiness of particular industries, I construct individual industry portfolios.  
I divide the sample LBOs according to their 4-digit SIC codes to 48 Fama French industry 
portfolios and form time-variant subgroups. All transactions missing a SIC code are labelled as 
Unknown at the bottom of the table. 
All transactions by industry Bankruptcy rates
Period 82-88 89-95 96-02 03-09 10-13 Total 82-88 89-95 96-02 03-09 10-13 Total
Business Services 32 120 521 1,258 700 2,631 7 % 5 % 5 % 3 % 1 % 3 %
Wholesale 30 77 304 734 378 1,523 6 % 5 % 8 % 5 % 1 % 5 %
Retail 49 87 185 422 176 919 7 % 6 % 12 % 13 % 4 % 12 %
Trading 6 43 198 443 213 903 8 % 7 % 3 % 5 % 2 % 4 %
Construction Materials 12 49 172 365 137 735 9 % 8 % 6 % 6 % 1 % 5 %
Machinery 22 49 171 333 138 713 11 % 9 % 6 % 4 % 1 % 4 %
Transportation 9 35 90 213 116 463 9 % 7 % 4 % 5 % 1 % 4 %
Consumer Goods 18 31 99 184 88 420 8 % 7 % 11 % 8 % 0 % 7 %
Rubber and Plastic Products 12 31 110 171 86 410 3 % 2 % 8 % 11 % 3 % 8 %
Food Products 11 38 94 172 75 390 2 % 2 % 6 % 6 % 0 % 5 %
Personal Services 7 17 71 201 92 388 2 % 2 % 8 % 3 % 1 % 4 %
Construction 4 14 74 180 107 379 5 % 4 % 8 % 4 % 0 % 4 %
Restaraunts, Hotels, Motels 11 18 77 178 84 368 10 % 8 % 12 % 8 % 0 % 8 %
Healthcare 2 17 73 159 87 338 12 % 10 % 4 % 3 % 0 % 2 %
Communication 6 27 75 144 69 321 6 % 5 % 11 % 3 % 0 % 6 %
Printing and Publishing 10 21 81 149 59 320 6 % 4 % 9 % 12 % 0 % 9 %
Electronic Equipment 9 30 95 127 51 312 9 % 8 % 7 % 3 % 0 % 5 %
Chemicals 5 16 80 136 58 295 9 % 8 % 6 % 4 % 0 % 4 %
Automobiles and Trucks 16 19 75 126 46 282 5 % 4 % 19 % 10 % 2 % 12 %
Electrical Equipment 10 20 59 116 51 256 4 % 3 % 5 % 1 % 0 % 3 %
Steel Works Etc 16 22 60 100 33 231 14 % 12 % 7 % 7 % 0 % 8 %
Business Supplies 6 22 60 92 48 228 5 % 4 % 10 % 5 % 0 % 7 %
Medical Equipment 9 18 45 95 48 215 4 % 3 % 4 % 2 % 0 % 2 %
Computers 10 26 57 77 39 209 0 % 0 % 7 % 1 % 0 % 4 %
Fabricated Products 4 14 52 90 36 196 0 % 0 % 12 % 7 % 0 % 8 %
Entertainment 2 11 61 85 31 190 8 % 8 % 13 % 5 % 0 % 8 %
Pharmaceutical Products 2 18 41 78 47 186 3 % 2 % 0 % 3 % 0 % 2 %
Measuring & Control Equipment 5 15 58 74 31 183 3 % 2 % 2 % 0 % 0 % 1 %
Textiles 11 17 59 67 27 181 8 % 6 % 14 % 9 % 0 % 10 %
Insurance 6 16 23 90 41 176 4 % 4 % 4 % 0 % 0 % 2 %
Banking 2 10 30 77 45 164 4 % 3 % 3 % 12 % 0 % 6 %
Apparel 8 15 33 71 20 147 5 % 4 % 12 % 6 % 0 % 7 %
Recreation 5 18 41 61 20 145 6 % 5 % 5 % 10 % 0 % 7 %
Petroleum and Natural Gas 0 7 26 68 38 139 1 % 1 % 0 % 4 % 0 % 2 %
Real Estate 1 4 38 54 33 130 9 % 7 % 3 % 4 % 0 % 4 %
Utilities 0 2 5 56 24 87 5 % 4 % 20 % 2 % 0 % 2 %
Aircraft 1 11 20 32 15 79 5 % 4 % 10 % 3 % 0 % 4 %
Candy & Soda 3 5 15 27 16 66 6 % 5 % 7 % 7 % 0 % 5 %
Agriculture 1 2 18 26 18 65 13 % 12 % 17 % 0 % 6 % 8 %
Other 0 3 14 35 13 65 10 % 8 % 14 % 3 % 0 % 5 %
Shipping Containers 2 6 14 20 11 53 8 % 6 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 4 %
Mines 2 2 7 15 9 35 2 % 2 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 %
Shipbuilding, Railroad Equipment 1 4 7 15 7 34 5 % 4 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 3 %
Beer & Liquor 4 9 9 5 4 31 4 % 4 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 6 %
Defense 0 5 1 8 3 17 6 % 5 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 %
Coal 1 2 4 6 0 13 5 % 4 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 8 %
Unknown 214 580 1,640 2,458 2,273 7,165 9 % 8 % 10 % 3 % 0 % 4 %
Total 597 1,623 5,142 9,693 5,741 22,796 7 % 8 % 8 % 5 % 1 % 5 %
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Figure 5 – Cyclicality and bankruptcy rates across industries in the sample 
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This figure depicts the relationship between cyclicality and bankruptcy rate of buyout companies in the sample during 1982-2009. The industry 
portfolios are arranged according to the Fama/French 48 industry portfolios. Cyclicality measures are adopted from Berman & Pfleeger (1997) and 
matched through portfolio companies’ SIC-industry codes. The cyclicality measure reflects the correlation of industry demand with GDP. Y-axis 
denotes the average bankruptcy rate within the sample’s industry portfolio. X-axis indicates the average cyclicality within the industry portfolio. Size 
of the ball resembles the number of companies within the industry portfolio.  
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Table 4 – Financial statement information for buyout companies 
 
Financials
Time t-1 t+0 t+1 t+2 b-2 b-1 b+0 b-2 b-1 b+0
Net debt to EBITDA (x)
Bankrupt Median 2.4x 5.2x 5.5x 5.2x 6.6x 8.6x 1.8x 3.0% 5.0% -14.0%
N 121 121 129 131 168 102 95 157 119 72
Non-bankrupt Median 0.8x 2.7x 3.5x 3.0x - - - - - -
N 1,393 1,030 1,145 1,176 - - - - - -
Interest coverage (x) (calculated as EBIT/Interest expenses)
Bankrupt Median 2.4x 1.5x 1.0x 0.9x 0.6x 0.1x 0.3x -36.0% -58.0% -44.0%
N 122 120 128 132 169 126 95 151 115 72
Non-bankrupt Median 3.9x 2.4x 1.6x 1.7x - - - - - -
N 1,198 1,007 1,095 1,140 - - - - - -
EBITDA margin (%) / Change in EBITDA (%)
Bankrupt Median 12.5% 12.5% 13.0% 11.5% 8.6% 6.6% 2.3% -9.0% -29.0% -23.0%
N 145 134 144 143 184 133 122 159 120 78
Non-bankrupt Median 11.3% 11.5% 12.3% 12.6% - - - - - -
N 1,654 1,271 1,347 1,391 - - - - - -
Capex to Sales (%)
Bankrupt Median 3.5% 3.3% 3.6% 4.5% 3.0% 2.8% 2.4% -2.0% -16.0% -14.0%
N 138 126 131 132 165 128 84 154 116 75
Non-bankrupt Median 3.1% 3.1% 3.2% 3.3% - - - - - -
N 1,267 934 1,022 1,087 - - - - - -
Cash conversion (%) (calculated as (EBITDA-Capex)/EBITDA)
Bankrupt Median 69.0% 73.0% 70.0% 65.0% 67.0% 70.0% 72.0% -5.0% -5.0% -7.0%
N 130 119 128 127 152 116 79 141 100 95
Non-bankrupt Median 76.0% 77.0% 78.0% 78.0% - - - - - -
N 1,203 886 960 1,027 - - - - - -
ROA (%)
Bankrupt Median 4.5% 2.5% 3.0% 2.3% 1.4% 0.0% 0.2% -29.0% -47.0% -8.0%
N 127 127 137 136 177 129 105 155 118 69
Non-bankrupt Median 4.0% 3.5% 3.2% 3.8% - - - - - -
N 1,560 1,197 1,285 1,316 - - - - - -
Total debt to Total assets (%)
Bankrupt Median 67.0% 74.6% 79.9% 78.3% 77.6% 78.5% 76.3% 5.0% 16.0% 14.0%
N 185 195 215 205 267 199 149 150 108 59
Non-bankrupt Median 61.8% 67.9% 71.0% 71.3% - - - - - -
N 3,239 3,093 3,201 3,186 - - - - - -
Fixed assets to Total assets (%)
Bankrupt Median 28.0% 20.0% 20.0% 24.0% 21.0% 34.0% 38.0% 0.0% 22.0% 11.0%
N 128 83 108 110 96 117 69 89 75 64
Non-bankrupt Median 17.0% 15.0% 12.0% 14.0% - - - - - -
N 1,544 663 767 879 - - - - - -
Altman Z (lower value indicates larger distress)
Bankrupt Median 1.76 1.1 1.08 1.16 1.19 0.85 1.15 - - -
N 128 122 134 130 174 127 105 - - -
Non-bankrupt Median 2.19 1.67 1.46 1.5 - - - - - -
N 1,358 1,019 1,090 1,149 - - - - - -
ChangesValues
This table reports the summary of financial statement information for sample buyout companies.   The 
ratios here represent the median values and changes for all the firm-year observations where available 
data exists. The availability of data between financial ratios is scattered. Hence, the median values may 
slightly differ from the latter analysis in section 6 where the sample consists of those buyouts that have 
all of the ratios below. Mean values for these estimation samples are reported in Appendix. Title t+0 
refers to the year when the transaction is announced and b+0 when the company goes bankrupt. Values 
column exhibits the financial ratios. Changes column reports the year-on-year changes (e.g. b-2 is the 
%-change from b-3 to b-2).  
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Table 5 - Descriptive bankruptcy filing statistics 
 
5.4.Variables 
Table 6 describes the variables which I use in latter analyses to explain bankruptcies for buyout 
companies in the sample. In addition to variables described in the table, I formulate an 
interaction variable in order to capture the relationship of cyclicality with economic state.  
This table describes bankruptcy filing statistics for sample buyouts when data is available. The data is 
based on Capital IQ bankruptcy database which considers U.S. bankruptcies. Chapter 11 refers to a 
bankruptcy protection where the company aims to reorganise its debt and re-emerge as a healthy 
organisation. In Chapter 7, bankruptcy firms’ assets are liquidated in order to pay creditors. Debtor-in-
possession financing (DIP) refers to financing arranged for a company under Chapter 11 which usually 
has priority over existing debt, equity and other claims. 
Bankruptcy filing type Involuntary Voluntary All
Chapter 11 10.7 % 70.9 % 67.7 %
Chapter 11 Liquidation to Chapter 7 0.0 % 1.2 % 1.2 %
Chapter 11 Reorganization to Chapter 11 Liquidation 3.6 % 11.4 % 11.0 %
Chapter 11 Reorganization to Chapter 7 10.7 % 6.7 % 6.9 %
Chapter 7 67.9 % 9.3 % 12.5 %
Chapter 7 to Chapter 11 Liquidation 0.0 % 0.2 % 0.2 %
Chapter 7 to Chapter 11 Reorganization 7.1 % 0.2 % 0.6 %
All filings 5.4 % 94.6 % 100.0 %
Observations 28 492 520
Average of months to emergence/liquidation Involuntary Voluntary All
Chapter 11 8.5 9.2 9.2
Chapter 11 Liquidation to Chapter 7 - 17.3 17.3
Chapter 11 Reorganization to Chapter 11 Liquidation - 9.8 9.8
Chapter 11 Reorganization to Chapter 7 10.7 14.0 13.4
Chapter 7 5.8 4.0 4.7
Chapter 7 to Chapter 11 Liquidation - 1.4 1.4
Chapter 7 to Chapter 11 Reorganization 19.6 2.5 13.9
All filings 8.6 9.2 9.2
Observations 28 492 520
Bankruptcy plan financing sources Number of financings % of all financed 
Issuance of Debt 84 65.1 %
Cash in Hand 27 20.9 %
Sale of Assets 42 32.6 %
Issuance of Equity 92 71.3 %
Observations 129 100.0 %
Debtor-in-posession financing types Number of financings % of all financed 
Term Loan 66 27.7 %
Revolving Credit 132 55.5 %
Credit Facilities 52 21.8 %
Corporate Bond/Note 1 0.4 %
Letter of Credit 7 2.9 %
Commercial Paper 1 0.4 %
Observations 238 100.0 %
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As discussed in section 5.3, in order to properly explain bankruptcy probability with cyclicality, 
the simultaneous effects of the state of the economy and underlying cyclicality of the business 
should be analysed together. I apply continuous pairwise-products representing pairwise 
interactions of (1) two-year GDP change three years before the transaction and to the announced 
transaction year, and (2) Berman & Pfleeger (1997) cyclicality measure.  
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Table 6 – Variable descriptions 
 
  
Dependent variable Description
Bankruptcy Binary variable that takes the value of one if the buyout company bankrupts or goes through 
debt reorganisation under incumbent private equity ownership within period January 1982- June 
2014. Source: Capital IQ, Orbis, Mergermarket.
Independent variables Description
Buyout characteristics Dummy variables. Source: Capital IQ
Bankruptcy Sale 1 = if buyout company is acquired from bankruptcy
Club deal 1 = if the buyout company is acquired by more than one PE firms
Corporate divestiture 1 = if the acquired buyout company is a partial spin-off of another continuing firm
Cross-border 1 = if the buyout company and acquirer(s) headquarters locate in different countries
Experienced investor 1 = if the acquirer(s) have experience from at least five prior buyouts
Geography 1 = if the buyout company is located in the U.S. or Canada
Going private transaction 1 = if the buyout company is publicly listed before the buyout
Industry 1 = if the buyout SIC code matches industry, 47 dummy variables (See Table 2)
Management participated 1 = if the buyout company's post-buyout management invests equity into the firm
Privatization of gov. entity 1 = if the buyout company is government owned before the buyout
Secondary LBO 1 = if the buyout company is acquired from another PE firm
Target firm characteristics Continuous variables. Source: Capital IQ
Altman Z Measure of financial distress and bankruptcy likelihood
Cash conversion Share of operational cash flow converted to free cash flow = (EBITDA-Capex)/EBITDA
Cyclicality Measure of the buyout's industry correlation with GDP. Source: Berman & Pfleeger (1997) 
Firm age 1= if the buyout firm younger than five years at the time of buyout 
Firm size Size of the firm = Log (Total Assets)
Interest coverage Company's ability to pay interest on outstanding debt = EBIT/Interest Expenses
Leverage1 Proportion of assets financed by debt = Total Debt/Total Assets
Leverage2 Ratio of debt compared to cash flow = Net Debt/EBITDA
Profitability1 Company's profitability with regard to operations = EBITDA/Revenue
Profitability2 Company's profitability with regard to capital  = Net Income/Total Assets
Tangibility Collateralisability of firm's assets = Fixed Assets/Total Assets
Transaction price Transaction price multiple = Enterprise Value/EBITDA
Economic climate Continuous and categorical variables. Multiple sources
Confidence General business confidence according to transaction year and buyout country. Source: OECD
Credit Domestic credit to private sector as a percentage of GDP according to transaction year and 
buyout country. Source: Worldbank
Growth Economic growth, GPD change in the transaction year. Source: OECD
Inflation Change in buyout company's consumer price index according to transaction year and buyout 
country. Source OECD
Creditor rights Measure of buyout company country's legal rights of creditors against defaulting debtors. 
Ranges from zero (poor) to four (strong). Source: Djankov et al. (2007)
Credit spread Indicator of credit risk premium and favourability of credit markets with respect to buyout 
location and transaction month. Measured as BofA ML high yield index  minus Libor  with 
respect to transaction month (for both U.S. and Europe). Source: Datastream
Credit tightening index Net percentage of U.S. loan officers at medium and large banks reporting tightening of 
standards for loans. Source: US Federal Reserve
This table provides a descriptive summary of variables used in the statistical analysis. They are 
introduced with brief descriptions and data sources. 
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6. Analysis and results 
The following analysis section is divided into two distinct parts. Firstly in section 6.1, I analyse 
the impact of capital structure and profitability ratios. Next, in part 6.2, I study the impact of 
deal type/source, cyclicality and economic climate on bankruptcy probability and initial 
financial distress risk (measured as Altman Z score). Furthermore, I explain my methodology 
with the analyses. Descriptions for variables are reported in Table 6. 
6.1.Portfolio firm financials  
Next, I report the methodology and results for the analysis regarding financial strength of 
portfolio companies in the sample. For the estimation I apply probit regression, a binary 
classification model, with Bankruptcy as the dependent variable. Probit model estimates the 
probability of an event occurring through maximum likelihood procedure for a set of 
explanatory variables (Dougherty, 2002). In a simplified form, the regression equation is as 
follows: 
Pr⁡(𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑐𝑦𝑖 = 1) = Φ(𝛽0 + ∑𝛽𝑖 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦⁡𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖)  (Equation 1) 
The coefficients for dependent variables from the probit estimation are subsequently converted 
to marginal effects at mean values. Mean values for estimation samples are reported in 
Appendix. Marginal effects enable interpretation of the probit model: for the mean company in 
the sample, each unit increase in the independent variable increases/decreases the probability 
of the dependent variable by the marginal effect expressed as a percent.  
However, as noted in section 5.3 the lack of financial data may expose the analysis to sample 
selection bias. The selection bias error arises when a non-random sample of a population causes 
some observations in the population to be less likely included than others. This results in a 
biased sample where all observations are not equally balanced or objectively represented 
(Dougherty, 2002). As the number of buyout companies that have adequate financial 
information is significantly lower compared to the sample, selection bias might yield 
inconsistent results. In the following subsections I will first describe methods to overcome the 
sample selection bias. Then, I analyse the effects of capital structure and profitability on buyout 
bankruptcy. 
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6.1.1. Controlling for sample selection bias 
I use probit model with sample selection to take into account the self-selection bias (Van de 
Ven & Van Praag, 1981). The latent model assumes that there exists an underlying relationship 
for the dependent variable 𝑦𝑖   
𝑦𝑖
∗ = 𝑥𝑖𝛽 + 𝑢1𝑖  (Latent equation) 
such that only the binary outcome is observed 
𝑦𝑗
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑡 = (𝑦𝑗
∗ > 0)  (Probit equation) 
However, if sample selection bias exists, the dependent variable is not always observed. 
Instead, the dependent variable for observation i is observed if 
𝑦𝑖
𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 = (𝑧𝑗𝜆 + 𝑢2𝑖 > 0)       (Selection equation) 
where 
𝑢1~𝑁(0,1) 
𝑢2~𝑁(0,1) 
corr(𝑢1, 𝑢2) = 𝜌 
When 𝜌 ≠ 0, standard probit techniques applied to the first equation would yield biased results. 
The inclusion of selection equation provides consistent, asymptotically efficient estimates for 
all the parameters in such models. The selection model should have a minimum of one variable 
that does not belong to the main probit equation.  (Press, 2005) 
The selection correction procedure estimates the sample-selection correlation term denoted as 
Mills ratio 𝜆. I structure the selection equation on the basis of whether there is adequate financial 
data to calculate interest coverage ratios for the observations. I obtain estimates for the 
coefficients ω of observable variables Zi (Selection equation) by using transaction year, 
portfolio company country dummies, creditor rights, transaction secondary features and 
company age as explanatory variables.  
Depending on whether the firm has adequate financials, Mills ratio is determined as follows: 
   𝜆𝑖 =
𝜙(?̂?∗𝑍𝑖)
Φ(?̂?∗𝑍𝑖)
    if Financialsi = 1 
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𝜆𝑖 =
−𝜙(?̂?∗𝑍𝑖)
1−Φ(?̂?∗𝑍𝑖)
   if Financialsi = 0 
where Φ denotes the density distribution function and 𝜙 the density distribution function of the 
standard normal distribution. After the coefficients for 𝜆𝑖  are determined, it is added as an 
independent variable to the probit regression. According to Edelen & Kadlec (2005), adding 𝜆 
into a regression is similar to adding a correlated omitted variable to a misspecified regression. 
Adding 𝜆 causes the explanatory coefficients to be estimated with less bias, or no bias if 𝜆 
completely captures the in-sample covariance between ηi and Zi .  
Having controlled for sample selection bias, I analyse how the firm specific capital structure, 
profitability and bankruptcy likelihood ratios are associated with buyout bankruptcy. The 
equation form is as follows (Dougherty, 2002): 
𝐸(𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑐𝑦𝑖|⁡𝐸𝑖 = 1, 𝑋𝑖) ⁡= ⁡⁡ 𝛽0 +⁡∑𝛽𝑖 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦⁡𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 +
𝜎𝑢𝜀
𝜎𝜀
𝜆𝑖 (Equation 2) 
where σuε is the population covariance of the selection category u and ε. σε is the standard 
deviation of ε and the inverse Mill’s ratio λi. The results for the second step of the model are 
reported in Table 7 along with the normal probit model estimations.  
6.1.2. Impact of portfolio company financial strength on bankruptcy 
Table 7 reports the results for both Probit and Probit with Heckman correction model. The 
models estimate buyouts conducted during 1994-2009 and aim to explain hypotheses about 
portfolio firm characteristics presented in section 4.2. Mean values for variables in the 
estimation are reported in Table 12 in appendix. The target company financials refer to financial 
statement information one year after the buyout. The statistical significance of the Inverse 
Mill’s ratio in the Heckman model indicates that sample selection exists, but even with the 
corrected error terms the model yields significant results despite small differences in 
coefficients. 
The results indicate that higher leverage significantly increases the probability of bankruptcy, 
as expected. One unit increase in leverage increases the likelihood of bankruptcy by 0.7%. For 
the mean company in the sample, this means an increase in leverage from 5.05x to 5.09x. The 
benefits of leverage derive from magnifying returns and avoiding taxes, but yet many LBOs 
use much higher leverage than needed (Opler & Titman, 1993). High levels of leverage leave 
  64 
little leeway for buyout companies in case the projected cash flows do not realise, which makes 
LBOs very vulnerable to unexpected changes. The finding is also in line with Axelson et al. 
(2012) who find that transaction-level leverage is negatively related to fund-level returns. The 
authors suggest that that private equity firms apply highly leveraged structures more in their 
own (carried) interest than their investors’. 
Companies that have higher cash conversion are less likely to go bankrupt, as expected. One 
unit increase in cash conversion % from its mean decreases the probability of bankruptcy by 3.6%. 
For the mean company in the sample, this means an increase from 62.2% to 79.6%. This 
indicates that firms with lower investment needs, and hence higher share of free cash flow to 
service debt, are significantly less likely to go bankrupt. 
Higher interest coverage (calculated as EBIT/Interest expenses) appears to decrease the 
probability of bankruptcy, as expected. Interest coverage measures the ability of a company to 
pay interest on its debt outstanding and lenders often require minimum levels for this in their 
covenants. One unit increase in interest coverage decreases the likelihood of bankruptcy by 2%. 
For the mean company in the sample, this means an increase from 2.2x to 2.3x. 
The strength of the portfolio company country’s creditor rights appears has a very significant 
effect on the bankruptcy probability. The results suggest that in countries with high creditor 
rights, buyouts are significantly less likely to bankrupt. This in line with the findings of Acharya 
et al. (2011) who report that less buyout leverage is used in countries where the potential 
liquidation value is lower (i.e. higher creditor rights). 
Finally, larger buyouts are less likely to bankrupt while more profitable companies measured 
by Return on Assets are less likely to bankrupt, as expected. Also, the tangibility of company’s 
assets does not appear to significantly affect the probability of bankruptcy.  
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Table 7 – Impact of portfolio company financial strength on bankruptcy 
 
Dependent variable
Model Probit (1) Probit (2) Heckprobit (1) Heckprobit (2) Dif. (1) Dif. (2)
Leverage1 (+) 0.119*** 0.070** 0.049
(0.026) (0.033)
[0.005] [0.007]
Profitability1 (+) -0.004 -0.002 -0.002
(0.007) (0.008)
[-0.000] [-0.000]
Cash conversion (-) -0.316** -0.387** 0.071
(0.158) (0.174)
[-0.014] [-0.036]
Leverage2 (+) 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.000
(0.003) (0.003)
[0.001] [0.003]
Profitability2 (-) -0.041*** -0.041*** 0.000
(0.014) (0.015)
[-0.006] [-0.013]
Tangibility (-) 0.289 0.232 0.057
(0.357) (0.390)
[0.040] [0.071]
Interest Coverage (-) 0.012 0.001 -0.182** -0.024 0.194 0.025
(0.410) (0.030) (0.091) (0.035)
[0.001] [0.000] [-0.017] [-0.007]
Firm size (+/-) -0.293** -0.247** -0.387** -0.285** 0.094 0.038
(0.142) (0.125) (0.154) (0.131)
[-0.013] [-0.034] [-0.036] [-0.087]
Creditor rights (-) -0.557*** -0.328*** -0.320*** -0.188 -0.237 -0.140
(0.089) (0.113) (0.036) (0.071)
[-0.024] [-0.045] [-0.051] [-0.058]
Inverse Mill's ratio -0.262* -0.323*
(0.205) (0.189)
Constant -5.219*** -1.789*** -4.281*** -0.932
(0.444) (0.481) (0.799) (0.667)
Observations 693 794 558 629
Adjusted R2 0.2320 0.2020 - -
Wald chi2 931.31 89.85 456.22 77.39
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bankruptcy rate 13.6 % 12.8 %
Exp. 
Sign
Bankruptcy
This table reports the results for Probit and Heckman correction regressions estimating the cross-
sectional portfolio firm characteristics’ effect on the probability of buyout bankruptcy during 1994-
2009. Financials refer to financial statement information one year after the buyout. The dependent 
variable, Bankruptcy, a binary variable has the value of one if the buyout bankrupts. Leverage1 is the 
portfolio company’s cash-based leverage, calculated as Net debt to EBITDA. Interest Coverage is the 
ability to pay interest on debt outstanding, calculated as EBIT to Interest expenses. Firm size is the 
logarithm of Total Assets. Profitability1 is cash flow-based profitability calculated as EBITDA to 
Revenue. Tangibility is Fixed assets to Total assets. Leverage2 is Total debt to Total Assets. 
Profitability2 is Net income to Total assets. Cash conversion is the share of operational cash flow 
converted into free cash flow, calculated as (EBITDA-Capital expenditures)/EBITDA. Inverse Mill’s 
ratio adjusts the error term for missing observations. All the ratios are winsorised with p(0.1). 
 
White’s heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Marginal effects at 
variable means are reported in square brackets. ***, **, and * denote the statistical significance of 
regression coefficients at the level of 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
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6.2.Buyout characteristics, cyclicality and economic climate  
In order to answer my hypotheses about the impact of deal source/type, cyclicality and 
economic climate, I conduct multiple regressions to test the significance across time periods 
using probit estimation. In addition to testing the actual bankruptcy events, I analyse the initial 
distress risk one year after the buyout has been conducted. In the latter analysis, as a dependent 
variable I use the Altman Z-score which measures companies’ financial distress likelihood 
(Altman, 1968). It is calculated as follows: 
Z' = 0.717T1 + 0.847T2 + 3.107T3 + 0.420T4 + 0.998T5 
where T1 = (Current Assets − Current Liabilities) / Total Assets, T2 = Retained Earnings / Total 
Assets, T3 = Earnings Before Interest and Taxes / Total Assets, T4 = Book Value of Equity / 
Total Liabilities, T5 = Sales/ Total Assets. The Altman Z yields a ratio for financial distress 
where a higher value indicates lower distress. 
The OLS-regression equation formula is as follows: 
𝐴𝑙𝑡𝑚𝑎𝑛⁡𝑍𝑖 = 𝛽0 + ∑𝛽𝑖 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦⁡𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖)  (Equation 3) 
Buyout characteristics are in the form of binary variables, which take the value of one if the 
criterion applies for the buyout. Factors of economic climate indicate the prevailing economic 
or credit conditions at the time when the buyout is announced in the country of the portfolio 
company’s headquarters. Since the availability of many indicators for economic climate are 
limited to up to 20 years of backwards data, the analysis focuses on buyouts conducted 1994 
onwards. Furthermore, allowing buyouts some time to go bankrupt, I also restrict the analysis 
to consider transactions conducted before the year 2010 (median years-to-bankruptcy in the 
sample is 5 years). In addition, the analysis is divided into separate subgroups in order to analyse 
differences in the effects during the very distinct boom and bust periods (see section 2.1.2). The 
first sub-sample covering years 1994-1997 takes place during the beginning and middle of the 
second private equity boom period, which was characterised by mostly buyouts of private firms 
and new industries such as ICT and financial services. The second sub-sample (1998-2001), 
captures the effects of the Dot-com bubble where a large number of LBOs was performed with 
very high valuation multiples and were concentrated around companies with less traditional 
business models (Carey & Morris, 2012). The third sub-sample (2002-2005) takes place after 
the burst of the internet bubble and was characterised by a weak credit market and sluggish 
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stock market until mid-2000s. The fourth sub-sample (2006-2009) captures the radical growth 
in liquidity in the credit markets and the subsequent subtraction due to the collapse of the sub-
prime market in 2007.  
6.2.1. Impact of buyout deal source and type on bankruptcy and financial distress 
Table 8 reports the results for Probit regressions about bankruptcy probability and Table 9 for 
OLS-regressions about the initial financial distress measured at one year after the transaction.  
The results indicate that buyouts that are originally acquired from under bankruptcy 
proceedings are 10% more likely to go bankrupt again compared to other sample buyouts, as 
expected. The effect is statistically significant and meaningful in each time period. At the same 
time Altman Z scores are insignificant (except 1994-1997), implying that bankruptcies in these 
cases do not derive from issues related to capital structure or profitability. This highlights the 
riskiness of the strategy of so called “vulture investors” who buy distressed entities with the 
hope of magnifying profits with a successful turnaround.  
Going private transactions, where the portfolio company is publicly listed before the LBO, 
appear to be significantly (3%) more likely to go bankrupt. Similarly these transactions entail 
also higher initial distress risks. The effect is particularly significant during the dot-com bubble, 
when the private equity firms were challenged by the stratospheric returns venture capital 
investors were making from IPOs for firms such as eBay, Netscape, Yahoo! and Amazon 
(Carey & Morris, 2012). In an effort to reach similar returns with a conventional LBO model, 
private equity firms might have taken excessive risks and bet on uncertain business models, 
which eventually went bust.  
The results on cross-border transactions indicate (2%) lower bankruptcy probability. The 
pattern of decreasing significance over the years indicates that during the earlier years, cross-
border transactions may have been considered to entail additional risks due to higher 
information asymmetry, and hence undertaken only if the outlook seemed very positive. 
Furthermore, cross-border transactions might have been less prone to bidding wars and hence 
private equity practitioners could have achieved sufficient returns with lower leverage. A closer 
look at the data supports this hypothesis. Cross-border transactions conducted during 1994 to 
2005 were carried on average approximately 0.5x lower leverage levels (Net debt to EBITDA). 
As the private equity industry has matured, private equity firms have set up international offices 
which might have caused the significance to disappear in the later years. 
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The perhaps most controversial finding among buyout characteristics is the effect of private 
equity firm experience on the bankruptcy probability. The findings suggest that during 1994 to 
2001, private equity firms with experience from at least five prior transactions are (2%) more 
likely conduct buyouts that eventually go bankrupt. In addition, experienced investors also have 
higher initial risk figures. I perform sensitivity alterations to the threshold number which 
determines the amount of prior transactions needed to be qualified as an experienced investor 
(analysis not reported), and find that the data yields similar results with longer transaction 
experience. Hence, it seems that established private equity firms make riskier investments and 
with a larger number of overall investments can also cope with higher average bankruptcy rates. 
In this sense, I check whether there exists survivorship among private equity firms based on 
bankruptcy, which would affect the number of later investments they make (analysis not 
reported). However, I find no evidence that bankruptcy events would significantly limit the 
amount of subsequent transactions for a private equity firm. Rather, it is likely that for private 
equity firms having low number of total transactions, they have avoided bankruptcies relatively 
well but not have not been able to provide high enough returns to raise capital for additional 
investments, as Chung et al. (2012) report. 
Management participation appears to have some decreasing effect (1-2%) on bankruptcy 
probability, as expected. Meanwhile, financial distress risk is not significantly different for 
these transactions. The significance and meaningfulness of management participation seems to 
decrease over time, in line with the percentage of deals having management inject their own 
equity capital into the portfolio company. As reported in Table 2, the fraction of deals including 
management participation has come down approximately 40% from its peak years in 1996-
2002. This perhaps represents a distinct change in the habits of private equity firms. This could 
indicate that private equity firms in general no longer see so much value in aligning the 
incentives of incumbent management with equity participation. As private equity firms often 
do not hesitate to replace underperforming management (Acharya et al., 2009), performance-
based schemes might have substituted for management’s direct stock ownership. 
Secondary buyouts are also associated with (2-3%) lower bankruptcy probability but higher 
initial financial distress risk, as expected. The effect on bankruptcy probability is significant 
and meaningful thorough the sample. This suggest that private equity ownership in general 
develops companies that are of better quality in terms of avoiding distress, compared to other 
sample buyouts. While investments in SBOs might not provide spectacularly high returns 
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because many of the operational or governance engineering opportunities have already been 
realised, the evidence suggest that they can be seen as less risky. Hence, private equity firms 
can apply capital structures that entail more risk. 
The findings for club deals provide some evidence for multiple investors’ improved ability of 
avoiding distressed buyouts. The hypothesis is however statistically significant only during 
1994-1997 and the mark of the coefficients varies among time-periods. Since there are variety 
of motivations for private equity firms to co-invest with other investors, I conclude that club 
deals is not significantly and consistently associated with bankruptcy probability.  
Finally, buyouts of companies founded less than five years from the transaction are associated 
with (1-3%) higher probability of bankruptcy, as expected. Logically, the effect exists 
especially during the Dotcom-bubble when many companies’ financial projections were loaded 
up with positive expectations about scalable possibilities brought by the Internet. A case in 
point in the data can be found from the buyout of Outsourcing Solutions Inc. conducted by two 
private equity firms Pamlico Capital and Madison Dearborn Partners in December 1999. 
Outsourcing Solutions, then a four-year old company, provided specialized outsourcing 
services to SMEs. Pamlico and Madison Dearborn paid a hefty 13 times EBITDA for the 
company amounting to $844 million and loaded it up with heavy leverage of 7.3x Net debt to 
EBITDA. The company soon ran into trouble by being unable to finance some of its operations 
and eventually failed to pay principal and interest due in late 2002. New business was almost 
impossible to obtain since customers knew that the debtors were in default on its bank loans. 
The company finally fell into hands of creditors and filed for Chapter 11 (Chapter 11 Cases, 
2012). 
6.2.2. Impact of economic climate and cyclicality on bankruptcy and financial distress 
The second part of Table 8 reports the probit regression results for explanatory variables that 
capture the effects of economic climate and cyclicality on buyout bankruptcy. These aim to 
answer hypotheses about cyclicality in section 4.2 and economic climate in section 4.3. 
The results consistently indicate that buyouts conducted during favourable economic conditions 
are more likely to go bankrupt. Especially, changes in the portfolio company country’s gross 
domestic product in the year when the transaction is performed, explain the effect particularly 
well. Two percent point increase in GDP from its mean (2%) appears to increase bankruptcy 
probability by two percent. Valuations generally reflect the state of the economic outlook, and 
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hence high economic growth associated with higher price tags may facilitate for more risky 
transactions. Furthermore, the insignificant coefficients for Altman Z score indicate that the 
determinants for bankruptcies conducted during high growth periods are found somewhere else 
than in capital structures. One possible explanation could be that the pre-buyout projections 
might be more upbeat if the economy is growing. If the portfolio company later fails to reach 
its ambitious projections, the risk of not being able to manage its debt load intensifies. 
Unfortunately, due to secretive nature of the private equity industry, the availability of 
transaction multiples does not enable sufficient analysis about the effect of valuations. 
Furthermore, the favourability of credit market appears also to be associated with higher 
probability of bankruptcy. For transactions conducted during 1998-2001 one unit increase in 
credit spread decreases the likelihood of bankruptcy by 1%. For the mean company in the 
sample, this means an increase from 4.6% to 7.2%. During 1994-2001, low spreads (high yield 
index minus Libor) and favourable credit conditions enabled high levels of leverage for 
borrowers. This consequently reflected in higher risk and default rates, in line with the findings 
of (Tykvová & Borell, 2012) who, however instead of bankruptcy events analyse bankruptcy 
likelihoods. 
Finally, I report that the cyclicality of the underlying business is also associated with higher 
bankruptcy probability for the sample period 1994-2009 despite lower initial financial distress 
risk. One unit increase in cyclicality measure increases the likelihood of bankruptcy by 3%. For 
the mean company in the sample, this means an increase from 0.19 to 0.36. However, by 
interacting the cyclicality measure with GDP (three-year change before the transaction), the 
results indicate that when invested at the right time in an economic cycle, the default probability 
is in fact lower.  
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Table 8 – Impact of deal characteristics, cyclicality and economic climate on bankruptcy 
  
Dependent variable
Time period 1994-2009 1994-1997 1998-2001 2002-2005 2006-2009
Buyout characteristics
Bankruptcy Sale (+) 0.973*** 0.687** 1.168*** 0.976*** 1.036***
(0.083) (0.328) (0.202) (0.139) (0.129)
[0.098] [0.074] [0.151] [0.090] [0.074]
Going Private Transaction (+/-) 0.278*** 0.348 0.468*** 0.135 0.136
(0.077) (0.253) (0.139) (0.151) (0.139)
[0.028] [0.037] [0.061] [0.013] [0.010]
Corporate Divestiture (-) -0.087* 0.188 -0.120 -0.162* -0.048
(0.049) (0.121) ((-0.1) (-0.09) (0.094)
[-0.009] [0.020] [-0.016] [-0.015] [-0.003]
Cross-Border (+/-) -0.185*** -0.348*** -0.169* -0.153* -0.115
(0.046) (0.131) ((-0.1) (0.092) (0.079)
[-0.019] [-0.037] [-0.022] [-0.014] [-0.008]
Experienced investor (-) 0.062 0.205** 0.198** 0.027 -0.009
(0.041) (0.104) (0.081) (0.077) (0.077)
[0.006] [0.022] [0.026] [0.002] [-0.001]
Management Participated (-) -0.064* 0.084 -0.175** -0.072 -0.023
(0.037) (0.098) (0.075) (0.069) (0.066)
[-0.006] [0.009] [-0.023] [-0.007] [-0.002]
Secondary LBO (-) -0.209*** -0.298* -0.16 -0.329*** -0.104
(0.051) (0.174) (0.106) (0.095) (0.085)
[-0.021] [-0.032] [-0.021] [-0.030] [-0.007]
Club deal (+/-) 0.002 -0.204** 0.096 0.046 -0.023
(0.039) (0.102) (0.076) (0.071) (0.072)
[0.000] [-0.022] [0.012] [0.004] [-0.002]
Younger than 5y (+) 0.110** 0.035 0.203** 0.016 0.119
(-0.05) (0.121) (0.085) (-0.11) (0.106)
[0.011] [0.004] [0.026] [0.001] [0.009]
Continues….
Exp. 
Sign
Bankruptcy
This table reports the results for probit regression on the effects of buyout characteristics and prevailing 
economic climate on buyout bankruptcy probability. Buyout is considered as bankrupt, if it is assigned 
with a value of one. Bankruptcy sale refers to buyouts where the company is acquired from bankruptcy. 
Going private transaction refers to buyouts where the company is publicly listed prior to buyout. 
Corporate Divestiture refers to buyouts where the portfolio company is a unit of another entity before 
the buyout. Cross border is a transaction where the portfolio company and the private equity firm’s 
headquarters locate in different countries. Experienced investor is when the private equity firm has 
experience from at least five prior transactions. Management participated refers to transactions where 
the portfolio company’s top executives have injected their personal money to the equity capital. 
Secondary LBO is when the portfolio company is also private equity backed prior to buyout. Club deal 
is when there is more than one buyer in addition to the private equity firm. Younger than 5y refers to 
buyout companies founded less than five years before the buyout is announced. Mean values for 
estimation sample are reported in Table 13 in Appendix to enable statistical inference of the marginal 
effects. 
 
White’s heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Marginal effects at 
variable means are reported in square brackets. ***, **, and * denote the statistical significance of 
regression coefficients at the level of 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.  
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Table 8 – Impact of deal characteristics, cyclicality and economic climate continued 
 
GDP change is the change in the portfolio company country’s gross domestic product in the transaction 
year. Credit spread is the spread in high yield index and libor rates in the month when the transaction 
is announced, values are separate for the U.S. and Europe. Cyclicality is the dependence of the portfolio 
company’s industry demand on GDP (adopted from Berman & Pfleeger (1997). GDP 
change*Cyclicality as an interaction variable measures the effect of cyclicality along with the 
prevailing economic cycle. Here the GDP change is the three-year change before the buyout. Credit 
tightening is the net percentage of banks reporting tightening standards for loans in the transaction year. 
Creditor rights is the legal rights of creditors against defaulting debtors, ranging from zero (poor) to 
four (strong), adopted from Djankov et al. (2006). 
Continues….
Dependent variable
Time period 1994-2009 1994-1997 1998-2001 2002-2005 2006-2009
Economic climate
GDP change (+) 0.156*** 0.067 0.101** 0.209*** 0.077***
(0.017) (-0.05) (0.043) (0.047) (0.028)
[0.016] [0.007] [0.013] [0.019] [0.006]
Credit spread (-) -0.01 -0.153** -0.067** 0.009 -0.012
(0.008) (0.071) (0.026) (0.024) (0.015)
[-0.001] [-0.016] [-0.009] [0.001] [-0.001]
Cyclicality (+) 0.336* -0.991* 0.254 0.186 0.309
(0.174) (0.587) (0.481) (0.295) (0.263)
[0.034] [-0.106] [0.033] [0.017] [0.022]
GDP change*Cyclicality (+/-) -0.029** 0.01 -0.025 -0.018 -0.018
(0.014) (0.049) (0.033) (-0.03) (0.025)
[-0.003] [0.001] [-0.003] [-0.002] [-0.001]
Credit tightening (+) 0.002* 0.003 0.003 0.004 -0.001
(0.001) (-0.01) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [-0.000]
Creditor rights (+) 0.022 -0.038 0.040 0.013 0.055**
(0.014) (0.036) (-0.03) (0.028) (0.026)
[0.002] [-0.004] [0.005] [0.001] [0.004]
Constant -2.022*** -5.184*** -1.518*** -2.355*** -2.207***
(0.084) (0.400) (0.276) (0.2400) (0.142)
Observations 14,602 1,709 3,071 4,182 5,640
Adjusted R2 0.0770 0.1060 0.0790 0.1010 0.0900
Wald chi2 442.06 1424.24 130.44 192.25 172.35
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bankruptcy rate 6.2 % 9.7 % 8.2 % 5.8 % 4.3 %
Exp. 
Sign
Bankruptcy
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Table 9 – Impact of deal characteristics, cyclicality and economic climate on financial 
distress 
 
  
Dependent variable
Time period 1994-2009 1994-1997 1998-2001 2002-2005 2006-2009
Buyout characteristics
Bankruptcy Sale (-) 0.281 -1.633*** 0.02 0.628 0.732
-(0.70) (-3.48) -(0.03) -(0.85) -(0.76)
Going Private Transaction (+/-) -0.614*** -0.599** -0.28 -0.437*** -0.639***
(-4.89) (-2.48) (-0.66) (-2.68) (-2.64)
Corporate Divestiture (+) -0.170 -0.596** -0.083 0.108 -0.331
(-1.12) (-2.04) (-0.19) -(0.35) (-0.92)
Cross-Border (+/-) 0.028 0.28 0.119 -0.432** 0.323
-0.22 -0.76 -0.31 (-2.06) -1.2
Experienced investor (-) -0.631*** -0.577* -0.953* -0.375 -0.710
(-3.59) (-1.96) (-1.97) (-1.43) (-1.35)
Management Participated (+) 0.155 -0.130 0.375 0.077 0.356
-(1.37) (-0.57) -(1.08) -(0.44) -(1.19)
Secondary LBO (-) -0.421*** -0.757*** -0.415 -0.324* -0.233
(-3.44) (-2.71) (-1.17) (-1.82) (-0.77)
Club deal (+/-) -0.133 0.221 -0.576* -0.143 -0.223
(-1.17) -(0.85) (-1.97) (-0.79) (-0.87)
Younger than 5y (-) 0.108 -0.253 0.919** -0.243 -0.745*
-(0.64) (-0.86) -(1.98) (-1.15) (-1.81)
Economic climate
GDP change (-) -0.041 -0.185 -0.074 -0.193 -0.053
(-0.89) (-1.60) (-0.49) (-1.62) (-0.33)
Credit spread (+) 0.036 0.337** 0.086 0.033 0.137***
-(1.60) -(2.06) -(0.98) -(0.46) -(3.25)
Cyclicality (-) 0.876** 0.225 1.059 0.515* -0.584
-(2.25) -(0.39) -(0.84) -(1.90) (-1.40)
Credit tightening (-) 0.001 0.049 -0.012 -0.013 -0.016
-(0.18) -(1.65) (-1.03) (-1.15) (-1.58)
Creditor rights (+) -0.020 -0.183 0.041 -0.006 -0.114
(-0.29) (-0.76) -(0.24) (-0.05) (-0.93)
Constant 1.893*** 2.165** 2.515** 2.097*** 2.021**
-4.81 -2.23 -2.05 -3.25 -2.17
Observations 986 245 244 319 178
R2 0.1330 0.3070 0.1980 0.2590 0.4040
F value 3.582 2.702 2.061 5.228 3.314
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exp. 
Sign
Altman Z (higher value indicates lower distress)
This table reports the results for an OLS-regression estimating the effects of buyout characteristics and 
economic climate on the initial bankruptcy likelihood of the buyout. The dependent variable is Altman 
Z bankruptcy likelihood score, calculated with the financials of the year following the transaction 
announcement. Economic climate variables represent the values of the year when the buyout is 
announced.  
 
T values based on White’s heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
Marginal effects at variable means are reported in square brackets. ***, **, and * denote the statistical 
significance of regression coefficients at the level of 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively 
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6.3.Robustness of the results 
All the regression analyses are conducted with White’s heteroskedasticity robust standard 
errors. Hence, the sub-populations do not suffer from differing variance and should not yield 
biased standard errors and disturb statistical significance.  
Moreover, all the models are tested for multicollinearity. I use Variance inflation factors (VIF) 
to identify possible signs of multicollinearity. A generally accepted maximum value for VIF is 
10 in order to safely conclude that the model does not suffer from multicollinearity. Since the 
VIF test only applies for linear regression, I change the order of my probit-model variables and 
then conduct the VIF tests with OLS-regression. As another test I compose correlation matrices 
for the models and inspect whether any variables have particularly high correlation between 
each other. As the VIF-values for all the models are well below 10 and the correlation matrices 
do not report alarming correlations, I conclude that my models are free from multicollinearity. 
Furthermore, like discussed in section 6.1.1, the lack of financial data may expose the analysis 
including financial rations to sample selection bias. In order to overcome this, I use Heckman 
methodology. The significant coefficient in the Inverse Mill’s ratio indicates that there exists 
some sample selection bias in the model. However, the corrected coefficients indicate similar 
results as the normal probit regression. 
The variables comprising of financial statement information might be heavily influenced by 
extreme values, which would in turn significantly disturb the mean values of the variable. In 
order to provide a more robust computation of the statistic, I use winsorising. Here, I replace 
10% of the values in each tails with the next value counting inwards from the extremes. 
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7. Conclusions 
The goal of my thesis is to analyse factors that could increase/decrease the probability that a 
leveraged buyout would fail and go bankrupt. Utilising a dataset of 22,796 LBOs in North 
America and Europe conducted during 1982-2013, I perform a variety of analyses that test the 
impact of deal type/source, portfolio firm financial strength, macro-economic environment and 
cyclicality of business. Furthermore, I test how these factors are associated with the initial 
financial distress risk (Altman Z). 
My empirical results support the hypothesis suggesting that deal source greatly influences the 
outcome of the buyout. The results indicate that on the safer front, secondary buyouts appear to 
be some 2% less likely to go bankrupt compared to other sample buyouts. This implicates that 
despite secondary buyouts’ generally lower upside potential (Alperovych et al., 2013), these 
deals can also be considered to be of better quality and have lower risk. The results also indicate 
that SBOs are generally performed with riskier financing structures. Hence, despite lower 
operational improvement potential, SBOs appear to be particularly good credit cases, meaning 
that banks would be more willing to provide higher leverage which improves return upside for 
private equity firms.  
On the riskier front, buyouts that are perhaps opportunistically acquired from bankruptcy 
proceedings, are some 10% more likely to go bankrupt compared to other sample buyouts. The 
results do not indicate that these transactions would have significantly riskier financing 
structures. Hence, these bankruptcies are likely to stem from other factors than leverage. This 
highlights the riskiness of the investment strategy of turnaround funds or so called vulture 
investors, as they primarily target distressed firms.  
Moreover, cross-border transactions appear to be some 2% less likely to go bankrupt. This is 
an interesting finding, since one might claim that these transactions would be more prone to 
bankruptcy as they entail additional challenges and risks due to information asymmetry, as well 
as, culture and language barriers. My results furthermore indicate that the capital structures of 
these buyouts are not significantly more or less risky compared to other sample buyouts. 
Instead, it may be that private equity firms pose more strict qualitative screening criteria and 
invest only in the most promising opportunities. Also, in the 1980s and 1990s before private 
equity industry spread worldwide and U.S. or UK private equity firms began setting up 
  76 
international offices, cross-border transactions provided untapped investment opportunities 
without costly bidding wars Carey & Morris (2012).  
With regards to investor experience and deal syndication my results do not support the 
hypothesis that increased knowledge and experience would be associated with lower 
bankruptcy rates. Interestingly, during the periods of 1994-1997 and 1998-2001, which were 
characterised by the dotcom bubble, buyouts conducted by experienced investors were actually 
more likely to go bankrupt. These results contradict the previous literature (see e.g.  Tykvová 
& Borell, 2012) which argues that experienced investors would be more able to avoid 
bankruptcies compared to inexperienced investors. However, initial distress risk levels show 
that during these periods, deals by experienced investors had also distinctively riskier financing 
structures than deals by less experienced investors. Hence, it may be that the higher leverage, 
supported by good lender relationships, caused a substantial number experienced private equity 
investors’ LBOs to backfire. 
Moreover, in terms of financial strength, my results indicate that higher leverage, lower 
profitability and weaker interest coverage are all significantly associated with a higher 
bankruptcy probabilities. Correspondingly, more highly leveraged deals are performed when 
credit markets are more favourable. These findings are in line with findings from previous 
studies by Tykvová & Borell (2012), Wilson & Wright (2013) and Kaplan & Stein (1993). As 
an additional feature, I study the impact of cash conversion (EBITDA-capex/EBITDA) on the 
probability of the buyout going bankrupt. The results indicate that firms with lower investment 
needs, and hence higher share of free cash flow to service debt, are significantly less likely to 
go bankrupt.  
Finally, my results indicate that from macro-economic perspective, buyouts performed during 
positive GDP growth are significantly more likely to go bankrupt. Historically, a two 
percentage point increase in GDP from its mean (2%) has increased the probability of a buyout 
going bankrupt by two percent. This indicates that during boom periods both private equity 
firms and lenders should be critical towards optimistic projections and sustainable leverage 
levels.  
Also, my results indicate that buyouts of companies operating in cyclical industries are 
particularly vulnerable if unexpected negative turns in the economy occur. As capital structures 
in LBOs are often aggressively leveraged, materialisation of projected cash flows is critical for 
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the success of the investment. If the portfolio company’s cash flows are highly dependent on 
the general economy, a negative turn in the cycle may push the company into bankruptcy. 
My research primarily focuses on distinguishing statistically available metrics that influence 
the probability that a buyout would go bankrupt. With my findings private equity practitioners 
and lenders may be more able to review their investment decisions, recognise potential pitfalls 
and align appropriate risk metrics as a basis of specific deal types, capital structures, cyclicality 
and economic climate. The main caveat with this approach is that qualitative factors such as 
CEO quality, wrong recruitments, success of R&D projects, performance of marketing efforts 
etc. are likely to have even greater impact on whether a buyout fails or thrives. Hence, one 
potential area of improvement would be a case analysis (as done by Andrade & Kaplan 1998) 
of various LBOs covering e.g. before-mentioned qualitative analyses on the factors that have 
caused the buyout to wind down.  
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Appendix  
Table 10 - Buyout characteristics and economic climate (European firms) 
 
This table reports the results for a cross-sectional probit regression on the effects of buyout 
characteristics and prevailing economic climate on buyout bankruptcy probability. Buyout is 
considered as bankrupt, if it is assigned with a value of one. Bankruptcy sale refers to buyouts where 
the company is acquired from bankruptcy. Going private transaction refers to buyouts where the 
company is publicly listed prior to buyout. Corporate Divestiture refers to buyouts where the portfolio 
company is a unit of another entity before the buyout. Cross border is a transaction where the portfolio 
company and the private equity firm’s headquarters locate in different countries. Experienced investor 
is when the private equity firm has experience from at least five prior transactions. Management 
participated refers to transactions where the portfolio company top executives have injected their own 
funds to the equity capital. Secondary LBO is when the portfolio company is also private equity backed 
prior to buyout. Club deal is when there is more than one buyer in addition to the private equity firm. 
Younger than 5y refers to buyout companies founded less than five years from when the buyout is 
announced. 
 
White’s heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Marginal effects at 
variable means are reported in square brackets. ***, **, and * denote the statistical significance of 
regression coefficients at the level of 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.  
Dependent variable
Time period 1994-2009 1994-1997 1998-2001 2002-2005 2006-2009
Buyout characteristics
Bankruptcy Sale (+) 1.061*** 0.643 1.411*** 1.242*** 0.955***
(0.120) (0.554) (0.287) (0.214) (0.187)
[0.100] [0.070] [0.162] [0.104] [0.072]
Going Private Transaction (+/-) 0.349*** 0.485 0.316 0.375* 0.329*
(0.109) (0.423) (0.193) (0.202) (0.191)
[0.033] [0.052] [0.036] [0.031] [0.025]
Corporate Divestiture (-) -0.132* 0.095 -0.151 -0.139 -0.117
(0.071) (0.196) (0.145) (0.135) (0.130)
[-0.012] [0.010] [-0.017] [-0.012] [-0.009]
Cross-Border (+/-) -0.190*** -0.269 -0.309** -0.091 -0.209*
(0.063) (0.179) (0.134) (0.130) (0.109)
[-0.018] [-0.029] [-0.036] [-0.008] [-0.016]
Experienced investor (-) 0.124** 0.032 0.453*** 0.129 -0.015
(0.061) (0.173) (0.137) (0.117) (0.101)
[0.012] [0.004] [0.052] [0.011] [-0.001]
Management Participated (-) -0.047 0.072 -0.193* 0.003 0.004
(0.052) (0.152) (0.106) (0.101) (0.090)
[-0.004] [0.008] [-0.022] [0.000] [0.000]
Secondary LBO (-) -0.268*** -0.207 -0.326** -0.377*** -0.230*
(0.073) (0.265) (0.150) (0.134) (0.127)
[-0.025] [-0.022] [-0.038] [-0.032] [-0.017]
Club deal (+/-) 0.057 -0.018 0.104 0.027 0.044
(0.054) (0.151) (0.109) (0.103) (0.099)
[0.005] [-0.002] [0.012] [0.002] [0.003]
Younger than 5y (+) 0.169** 0.219 0.300** -0.096 0.242*
(0.071) (0.191) (0.127) (0.164) (0.140)
[0.016] [0.024] [0.035] [-0.008] [0.018]
Continues….
Bankruptcy
Exp. 
Sign
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Table 8 – Impact of deal characteristics, cyclicality and economic climate (European 
firms) continued 
 
Djankov et al. (2006)  
GDP change is the change in the portfolio company country’s gross domestic product in the transaction 
year. Credit spread is the spread in high yield index and libor rates in the month when the transaction 
is announced, values are separate for the U.S. and Europe. Cyclicality is the dependence of the portfolio 
company’s industry demand on GDP (adopted from Berman & Pfleeger (1997). GDP 
change*Cyclicality as an interaction variable measures the effect of cyclicality along with the 
prevailing economic cycle. Here the GDP change is the three-year change before the buyout. Credit 
tightening is the net percentage of banks reporting tightening standards for loans in the transaction year. 
Creditor rights is the legal rights of creditors against defaulting debtors, ranging from zero (poor) to 
four (strong), adopted from Djankov et al. (2006). 
Continues….
Dependent variable
Time period 1994-2009 1994-1997 1998-2001 2002-2005 2006-2009
Economic climate
GDP change (+) 0.139*** 0.087 0.182*** 0.264*** 0.061*
(0.023) (0.074) (0.061) (0.066) (0.034)
[0.013] [0.009] [0.021] [0.022] [0.005]
Credit spread (-) -0.019* -0.096 -0.037 -0.059* -0.006
(0.012) (0.118) (0.034) (0.035) (0.020)
[-0.002] [-0.010] [-0.004] [-0.005] [-0.000]
Cyclicality (+) 0.196 -1.216 0.618 0.228 0.21
(0.250) (0.743) (0.673) (0.458) (0.414)
[0.019] [-0.132] [0.071] [0.019] [0.016]
GDP change*Cyclicality (+/-) -0.012 0.019 -0.06 -0.046 0.036
(0.019) (0.056) (0.047) (0.045) (0.040)
[-0.001] [0.002] [-0.007] [-0.004] [0.003]
Credit tightening (+) 0.003** 0.007 0.006 0.015*** -0.001
(0.002) (0.015) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003)
[0.000] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [-0.000]
Creditor rights (+) 0.024 0.012 0.001 -0.051 0.084**
(0.019) (0.053) (0.041) (0.042) (0.036)
[0.002] [0.001] [0.000] [-0.004] [0.006]
Constant -2.052*** -5.605*** -2.232*** -2.033*** -2.273***
(0.119) (0.642) (0.397) (0.346) (0.190)
Observations 7353.0 680.0 1475.0 2051.0 2773.0
Adjusted R2 0.0860 0.1020 0.1070 0.1300 0.1100
Wald chi2 -268.82 -458.69 -95.37 -138.41 -113.37
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bankruptcy rate 5.9 % 9.4 % 7.7 % 5.4 % 4.5 %
Exp. 
Sign
Bankruptcy
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Table 11 - Buyout characteristics and economic climate (North American firms) 
 
  
This table reports the results for a cross-sectional probit regression on the effects of buyout 
characteristics and prevailing economic climate on buyout bankruptcy probability. Buyout is 
considered as bankrupt, if it is assigned with a value of one. Bankruptcy sale refers to buyouts where 
the company is acquired from bankruptcy. Going private transaction refers to buyouts where the 
company is publicly listed prior to buyout. Corporate Divestiture refers to buyouts where the portfolio 
company is a unit of another entity before the buyout. Cross border is a transaction where the portfolio 
company and the private equity firm’s headquarters locate in different countries. Experienced investor 
is when the private equity firm has experience from at least five prior transactions. Management 
participated refers to transactions where the portfolio company top executives have injected their own 
funds to the equity capital. Secondary LBO is when the portfolio company is also private equity backed 
prior to buyout. Club deal is when there is more than one buyer in addition to the private equity firm. 
Younger than 5y refers to buyout companies founded less than five years from when the buyout is 
announced. 
 
White’s heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Marginal effects at 
variable means are reported in square brackets. ***, **, and * denote the statistical significance of 
regression coefficients at the level of 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.  
Dependent variable
Time period 1994-2009 1994-1997 1998-2001 2002-2005 2006-2009
Buyout characteristics
Bankruptcy Sale (+) 0.901*** 0.795* 0.952*** 0.840*** 1.117***
(0.115) (0.447) (0.305) (0.194) (0.180)
[0.096] [0.088] [0.141] [0.085] [0.071]
Going Private Transaction (+/-) 0.207* 0.267 0.658*** -0.09 0.048
(0.111) (0.333) (0.208) (0.242) (0.216)
[0.022] [0.029] [0.097] [-0.009] [0.003]
Corporate Divestiture (-) -0.039 0.301* -0.118 -0.169 0.057
(0.067) (0.167) (0.138) (0.123) (0.138)
[-0.004] [0.033] [-0.017] [-0.017] [0.004]
Cross-Border (+/-) -0.187*** -0.453** -0.028 -0.248* -0.02
(0.068) (0.207) (0.150) (0.136) (0.118)
[-0.020] [-0.050] [-0.004] [-0.025] [-0.001]
Experienced investor (-) 0.012 0.330** 0.035 -0.086 -0.038
(0.057) (0.141) (0.106) (0.108) (0.119)
[0.001] [0.037] [0.005] [-0.009] [-0.002]
Management Participated (-) -0.086* 0.128 -0.173 -0.139 -0.110
(0.052) (0.131) (0.111) (0.100) (0.102)
[-0.009] [0.014] [-0.026] [-0.014] [-0.007]
Secondary LBO (-) -0.140** -0.401* -0.045 -0.311** 0.059
(0.071) (0.233) (0.155) (0.134) (0.118)
[-0.015] [-0.044] [-0.007] [-0.031] [0.004]
Club deal (+/-) -0.054 -0.402*** 0.104 0.069 -0.105
(0.056) (0.146) (0.110) (0.102) (0.110)
[-0.006] [-0.044] [0.015] [0.007] [-0.007]
Younger than 5y (+) 0.063 -0.119 0.133 0.124 -0.003
(0.070) (0.168) (0.115) (0.153) (0.173)
[0.007] [-0.013] [0.020] [0.012] [-0.000]
Continues….
Exp. 
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Table 11 - Buyout characteristics and economic climate (North American firms) 
continued 
 
GDP change is the change in the portfolio company country’s gross domestic product in the transaction 
year. Credit spread is the spread in high yield index and libor rates in the month when the transaction 
is announced, values are separate for the U.S. and Europe. Cyclicality is the dependence of the portfolio 
company’s industry demand on GDP (adopted from Berman & Pfleeger 1997). GDP 
change*Cyclicality as an interaction variable measures the effect of cyclicality along with the 
prevailing economic cycle. Here the GDP change is the three-year change before the buyout. Credit 
tightening is the net percentage of banks reporting tightening standards for loans in the transaction year. 
Creditor rights is the legal rights of creditors against defaulting debtors, ranging from zero (poor) to 
four (strong), adopted from Djankov et al. (2006). 
Continues….
Dependent variable
Time period 1994-2009 1994-1997 1998-2001 2002-2005 2006-2009
Economic climate
GDP change (+) 0.168*** 0.046 0.012 0.137** 0.092*
(0.024) (0.072) (0.062) (0.069) (0.050)
[0.018] [0.005] [0.002] [0.014] [0.006]
Credit spread (-) -0.002 -0.258*** -0.103*** 0.070** -0.03
(0.011) (0.092) (0.038) (0.034) (0.025)
[-0.000] [-0.028] [-0.015] [0.007] [-0.002]
Cyclicality (+) 0.439* -1.033 -0.132 0.189 0.372
(0.233) (0.908) (0.703) (0.406) (0.330)
[0.047] [-0.114] [-0.020] [0.019] [0.024]
GDP change*Cyclicality (+/-) -0.039** 0.012 0.018 0.025 -0.063*
(0.019) (0.080) (0.051) (0.045) (0.034)
[-0.004] [0.001] [0.003] [0.002] [-0.004]
Credit tightening (+) 0.000 0.003 0.002 -0.006 0.001
(0.002) (0.013) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [-0.001] [0.000]
Creditor rights (+) 0.022 -0.081 0.081* 0.077* 0.019
(0.020) (0.052) (0.046) (0.042) (0.042)
[0.002] [-0.009] [0.012] [0.008] [0.001]
Constant -2.012*** -4.757*** -0.889** -2.669*** -2.080***
(0.119) (0.572) (0.381) (0.342) (0.213)
Observations 7095.0 883.0 1441.0 1913.0 2600.0
Adjusted R2 0.0780 0.1370 0.0800 0.1160 0.1180
Wald chi2 -234.09 -938.76 -69.26 -130.09 -110.78
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bankruptcy rate 6.7 % 11.2 % 9.6 % 6.4 % 3.9 %
Exp. 
Sign
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Table 12 - Mean values for estimates in Table 7 
 
 
Table 13 – Mean values for estimates in Table 8 
 
This table reports mean values for independent variables in estimation samples in Table 7. The 
mean values enable statistical inference of the size of marginal effects in estimations. 
Corresponding standard errors and marginal effects are provided in Table 7. 
Mean values in estimation samples
Model Probit (1) Probit (2) Heckprobit (1) Heckprobit (2)
Leverage1 5.054 5.054
Profitability1 16.347 16.347
Cash conversion 0.622 0.622
Leverage2 78.676 78.676
Profitability2 5.460 5.460
Tangibility 0.212 0.212
Interest Coverage 2.211 2.832 2.211 2.832
Firm size 2.711 2.660 2.711 2.660
Creditor rights 1.242 1.272 1.242 1.272
Observations 693 794 558 629
This table reports mean values for independent variables in estimation samples in Table 8. The 
mean values enable statistical inference of the size of marginal effects in estimations. 
Corresponding standard errors and marginal effects are provided in Table 8. 
Mean values in estimation samples
Time period 1994-2009 1994-1997 1998-2001 2002-2005 2006-2009
Buyout characteristics
Bankruptcy Sale 0.0244 0.0094 0.0150 0.0273 0.0319
Going Private Transaction 0.0404 0.0298 0.0456 0.0375 0.0429
Corporate Divestiture 0.1811 0.1627 0.1876 0.2059 0.1647
Cross-Border 0.2247 0.1884 0.2130 0.2449 0.2271
Experienced investor 0.7402 0.7045 0.7336 0.7274 0.7640
Management Participated 0.3895 0.3950 0.4425 0.4070 0.3461
Secondary LBO 0.1790 0.0913 0.1501 0.2226 0.1890
Club deal 0.2900 0.3008 0.2940 0.3121 0.2681
Younger than 5y 0.1246 0.1691 0.1801 0.1126 0.0899
Economic climate
GDP change 0.0244 0.0094 0.0150 0.0273 0.0319
Credit spread 0.0404 0.0298 0.0456 0.0375 0.0429
Cyclicality 0.1811 0.1627 0.1876 0.2059 0.1647
GDP change*Cyclicality 0.2247 0.1884 0.2130 0.2449 0.2271
Credit tightening 0.7402 0.7045 0.7336 0.7274 0.7640
Creditor rights 0.3895 0.3950 0.4425 0.4070 0.3461
Observations 14,602 1,709 3,071 4,182 5,640
